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Police Shootings: Is Accountability the Enemy of 
Prevention? 
BARBARA E. ARMACOST* 
Police officers shoot an unarmed man or woman. The victim’s family and 
community cry out for someone to be held accountable. In minority 
communities, where a disproportionate number of officer-involved 
shootings occur, residents suspect that racial animus and stereotypical 
assumptions about “dangerous black men” played a part. Citizens seek 
accountability by filing lawsuits and demanding criminal prosecutions. 
They are usually disappointed: the majority of police-involved shootings 
are deemed “justified” by police investigators and courts, and no 
criminal charges are brought. If so, this is the end of the inquiry under 
current legal standards and there is no accountability. There is also no 
legal reason to ask why the shooting occurred and how it could have been 
prevented. This Article argues that the current accountability paradigm 
is hindering genuine progress in decreasing the number of police-
involved shootings, including those motivated by racism. We need to look 
beyond the limited time frame embraced by the current legal standard 
and view police-involved shootings as organizational accidents. 
Borrowing lessons learned from the aviation and healthcare fields, this 
Article urges a prevention-first approach that applies systemic analysis 
to what are systems problems. In these sectors, investigations of tragic 
accidents employ Sentinel Event Review, a systems-oriented strategy that 
looks back to discover all the factors that contributed to the event and 
looks forward to identify systemic reforms that could mitigate the chance 
of recurrence. The goal is to create systemic barriers that make it more 
difficult for sharp-end actors to err or misbehave. I am not arguing that 
individual police officers should escape responsibility for their actions. 
But our current relentless focus on accountability—while an 
understandable human reaction—has become the enemy of prevention in 
the very communities that need it most. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Societal outrage over the death of civilians at the hands of police may be 
near an all-time high. The relentless litany of tragic deaths—Stephon Clark,1 
 
 1 Courtney Teague & Amy B. Wang, Sacramento Police Officers Who Fatally Shot 
Stephon Clark Will Not Be Charged, Prosecutor Says, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/02/sacramento-police-officers-who 
-fatally-shot-stephon-clark-will-not-be-charged-prosecutor-says/?utm_term=.8b19d9 
cd72cb [https://perma.cc/HK9M-3H7J]. 
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Eric Logan,2 Justine Ruszczyk Damond,3 Laquan McDonald,4 Eric Garner,5 
Freddie Gray,6 Sandra Bland,7 Philando Castile,8 Tamir Rice,9 Alton Sterling,10 
Michael Brown,11 Trayvon Martin,12 and others named and unnamed—has 
provoked street protests and recurring calls for prosecutorial intervention. 
Families, neighbors, and communities want police officers to explain why they 
found it necessary to use deadly force. Society looks to prosecutions and civil 
damages actions to provide accountability by unearthing the truth about the 
circumstances of the shooting, imposing sanctions for wrongdoing, and 
deterring any misconduct that may have led to the incident. People are dead and 
we thirst for justice. “Officers must be held accountable,” we cry. “This must 
never be allowed to happen again.” 
 
 2 Associated Press, Special Prosecutor Named to Investigate South Bend Shooting of 
Eric Logan, PBS (July 3, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/special-
prosecutor-named-to-investigate-south-bend-shooting-of-eric-logan [https://perma.cc 
/65GY-23X8]. 
 3 Emily Shapiro, Ex-Minneapolis Police Officer Sentenced to 12.5 Years for Fatal 
Shooting of Justine Ruszczyk Damond, ABC NEWS (June 7, 2019), https://abcnews.go 
.com/US/minneapolis-police-officer-sentenced-fatal-shooting-justine-ruszczyk/story 
?id=63547748 [https://perma.cc/DZ7W-HHS6]. 
 4 Lorraine Swanson, Van Dyke Atty. Warns of ‘Ferguson Effect’ Amid ‘Historic’ 
Verdict, PATCH (Oct. 5, 2018), https://patch.com/illinois/chicago/verdict-reached-van-
dyke-murder-trial [https://perma.cc/UYS9-K4S3]. 
 5 Josh Sanburn, Behind the Video of Eric Garner’s Deadly Confrontation with New 
York Police, TIME (July 22, 2014), https://time.com/3016326/eric-garner-video-police-
chokehold-death/ [https://perma.cc/XG5S-NPC2]. 
 6 Associated Press, Freddie Gray’s Death in Police Custody—What We Know,  
BBC NEWS (May 23, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32400497 
[https://perma.cc/5CGW-KNJV]. 
 7 Oliver Laughland, Sandra Bland: Video Released Nearly Four Years After Death 
Shows Her View of Arrest, GUARDIAN (May 7, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/may/07/sandra-bland-video-footage-arrest-death-police-custody-latest-news 
[https://perma.cc/X824-2KH7]. 
 8 Teresa Nelson, Two Years After the Police Killing of Philando Castile, Justice 
Continues to Be Denied, ACLU (July 6, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-
justice/two-years-after-police-killing-philando-castile-justice-continues-be-denied 
[https://perma.cc/PPC7-L4YH]. 
 9 Eric Heisig, Tamir Rice Shooting: A Breakdown of the Events that Led to the 12-
Year-Old’s Death, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.cleveland.com/court-
justice/2017/01/tamir_rice_shooting_a_breakdow.html [https://perma.cc/U7JE-CCP6]. 
 10 Eric Levenson, Baton Rouge Police Chief Apologizes for Hiring the Officer Who 
Killed Alton Sterling, CNN (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/01/us/alton-
sterling-baton-rouge-police/index.html [https://perma.cc/W8QF-CXD6]. 
 11 Timothy Williams, Five Years After Michael Brown’s Death, His Father Wants a 
New Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/09/ 
us/ferguson-michael-brown.html [https://perma.cc/5L7G-Q8AA]. 
 12 Karen Grigsby Bates, A Look Back at Trayvon Martin’s Death, and the Movement It 
Inspired, NPR (July 31, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2018/07/ 
31/631897758/a-look-back-at-trayvon-martins-death-and-the-movement-it-inspired 
[https://perma.cc/Q7EG-S37D].  
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And yet it does happen again. Multiple factors contribute to this, perhaps 
predominant among them, ongoing structural racism.13 Unarmed African-
American individuals are 3.5 times more likely to be shot by police than 
unarmed white persons.14 Efforts to hold individual officers directly accountable 
for their racially motivated actions, though, may be the enemy of prevention. 
Without in any way minimizing the reality of racism, we need to address police 
shootings from a different angle. This Article argues that the current 
accountability paradigm—targeting the officer who pulled the trigger—is 
actually hindering genuine progress in decreasing the numbers of these 
tragedies, including those motivated by racism. 
We need to understand police shootings (and other acts of excessive force 
that result in the death of unarmed civilians) as tragic organizational accidents. 
We need a shift towards a prevention-first approach that applies systemic 
analysis to what are systems problems.  
The current accountability paradigm is fundamentally flawed for three 
related reasons. First, the idea that successful prosecutions and lawsuits after a 
police-involved shooting will prevent future tragedies relies on several related, 
but fundamentally flawed assumptions:15 it assumes that police shootings result 
solely (or primarily) from individual misconduct by the person who pulled the 
trigger, that police reform should focus on changing the behavior of these 
officers, and that lawsuits against individual officers will result in the kinds of 
changes that will reduce the incidence of police violence.16 
In fact, the killing of unarmed civilians by police results from multiple 
causes, both human and systemic, that set the stage for the tragic moment when 
the shot was fired. Our current focus on only the immediate causer—and the 
narrow time frame that defines his actions—ignores this broader set of causal 
factors. This is not to say that the shooter is not blameworthy. But the single-
 
 13 Brentin Mock, How Structural Racism Is Linked to Higher Rates of Police Violence, 
CITYLAB (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/02/the-role-of-structural-
racism-in-police-violence/553340/ [https://perma.cc/2NGU-KS2K]. 
 14 Roland G. Fryer, Jr., Reconciling Results on Racial Differences in Police Shootings 
1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24238, 2018). 
 15 Many scholars, including myself, have argued that—even apart from the systemic 
arguments I am making in this Article—criminal prosecutions and civil damages actions are 
largely ineffective in regulating police misconduct. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, 
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 464–77 (2004); 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: 
Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 285–86 
(1988) (arguing the deterrent effect of civil damage payments by municipalities on the 
conduct of individual officers remains highly questionable); Samuel Walker, The New 
Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits 
in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 18–19 (2003). These arguments have been 
thoroughly and exhaustively explored and are widely accepted by scholars. I do not rehash 
them here.  
 16 Walker, supra note 15, at 7. 
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minded focus on the officer who discharged his weapon leaves the officer’s 
colleagues embedded in the same organization that led to his mistakes. It misses 
the opportunity to address the systemic and organizational features that make it 
possible (or probable) that individual officers will continue to make mistakes or 
misbehave. 
The second reason the accountability paradigm is flawed is that its tools—
civil and criminal actions and internal police department investigations—ask the 
narrow question of whether the shooting was “justified” or “reasonable” at the 
precise moment the shot was taken.17 When a shooting is deemed justified, all 
other examination of the tragedy ceases. This adds to the tragedy, since further 
examination could illuminate its root causes and point us to systemic reforms 
that could reduce the incidence of future officer-involved shootings.  
It is easy to miss the perverse implications of this analysis. The very word 
“justified” implicitly assumes that this shooting, and shootings like it, are 
unavoidable or even desirable. By applying a case-by-case inquiry, however, 
the analysis never squarely asks the question whether these kinds of shootings—
shootings under these or similar circumstances—are reasonable or societally 
justified. In addition, the terms “reasonable” and “justified” deeply fail to 
express adequately the human values at stake: every loss of human life is 
regrettable and every police shooting a tragedy, even if—at the moment the shot 
was taken—the police officer reasonably believed it was necessary. 
Third, the current accountability paradigm is inadequate because it applies 
a single-dimension analysis to an entity—a police department—which 
organizational management experts would define as a “complex” and “tightly 
coupled” organization.18 Such organizations by their nature are highly 
susceptible to systems failure.19 Yet present investigations do not apply systems-
oriented analysis and review. This in turn prevents us from identifying the 
correspondingly wider range of potential preventative measures that could (or 
must) be taken to prevent similar tragic shootings in the future. 
Many other actors may have contributed to the circumstances or increased 
the risks that led to the fatal moment; for example, the dispatcher who sent the 
officer to the scene, the supervisors who wrote the use-of-force policies, the 
managers who trained on those policies, the magistrate who signed an arrest 
warrant, or the legislature that set the terms of the officer’s arrest authority. Non-
human factors, such as overtime or moon-lighting policies that promote 
overwork, unenforced discipline rules, patterns of repeated risk-taking behavior, 
pressure to effectuate quotas of arrests or stops, stop-and-frisk policies, laws that 
define crimes and regulate police powers, and cultural patterns that promote 
over-aggressive policing, may also have contributed to the officer’s actions. 
 
 17 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 
135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015); infra note 275 (discussing circuit split on precise time frame 
for determining reasonableness in excessive force cases). 
 18 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of police departments as complex systems. 
 19 See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS 5 (1984). 
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If the goal is not only punishment and accountability for individual actions, 
but also prevention of future similar harm-causing incidents, then it is essential 
that these other causes be part of the analysis. We must move beyond the current 
strategy of looking backward to identify errors to a forward-looking approach 
that employs the kind of systems-oriented review that is currently not available 
as part of the adversarial process of criminal prosecution and civil litigation.20 
Sadly, accountability review fails even if it succeeds in holding the shooter 
responsible. Consider the recent prosecution of Officer Van Dyke, who was 
convicted of second-degree murder and sixteen counts of aggravated battery in 
the shooting death of Laquan McDonald.21 The prosecutor called the verdict “a 
satisfying victory” and McDonald’s family called it “justice.”22 The African-
American community filled the streets to celebrate the first guilty verdict in fifty 
years in connection with a Chicago police-involved shooting.23 Officer Van 
Dyke will spend at least ten years in prison.24 But police leaders say the sixteen 
shots that killed Laquan McDonald were “absolutely justified,” that politicians 
“have used this case . . . to really kick around the Chicago Police 
Department.”25 Van Dyke’s attorney, Daniel Herbert, warned that the verdict 
will make police officers into “security guards” who will be unwilling to “get 
out of the car to confront somebody.”26 The community is overjoyed with the 
verdict while the Fraternal Order of Police calls it a “sham” trial, and Herbert 
echoed it as a “sad day for law enforcement.”27 Will anything change as the 
parties talk past each other? No one seems to be asking why this happened. 
To outsiders, there may seem to be a variety of responses giving voice to 
community outrage. But as I will argue, none of these as currently structured—
internal investigations, civilian reviews, mayoral task forces—are sufficiently 
reliable, thorough, independent, or systemic. Moreover, because all focus on 
 
 20 The Supreme Court has foreclosed forward-looking, equitable remedies that have 
been useful in other contexts, including school desegregation and prison reform. See City of 
L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1982). Entity lawsuits, which are designed to hold the entity 
liable for the immediate causer’s actions, do not produce the kind of systems-oriented review 
I am advocating for here. Pattern or practice lawsuits against municipalities and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14141 lawsuits are also limited in addressing systemic issues involving additional actors 
and latent causes. 
 21 Swanson, supra note 4. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See id. 
 25 Nick Blumberg, Police Union President Defends Van Dyke, Vows Appeal, WTTW 
(Oct. 5, 2018), https://news.wttw.com/2018/10/05/police-union-president-defends-van 
-dyke-vows-appeal [https://perma.cc/V79M-BVMR]. 
 26 Andy Grimm & Jon Seidel, 16 Shots, a Guilty Verdict and a Chicago Cop Goes to 
Jail for Killing a Teen, CHI. SUN TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://chicago.suntimes.com/ 
2018/10/5/18422864/16-shots-a-guilty-verdict-and-a-chicago-cop-goes-to-jail-for-
killing-a-teen [https://perma.cc/75WS-G6EW].  
 27 Blumberg, supra note 25; Swanson, supra note 4. 
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accountability, the queries that could raise reforms advancing prevention are 
absent.28 
Given racial realities, it is tempting to say, “We know why this happened: a 
white police officer, motivated by racial animus and stereotypical assumptions 
about dangerous black men, shot a black man—again.” Even when this account 
is partially true, individual racism is not a sufficient causal story if the goal is to 
prevent the next shooting. We need to be asking a whole series of deeper “why” 
questions that go behind the racial explanation to uncover the systemic factors 
that enabled the officer’s actions, including factors that facilitated the officer’s 
race-motivated actions. 
In short, what is needed instead is a paradigm focused primarily on 
prevention. For it, we can borrow from lessons learned in the aviation and 
healthcare fields. In these sectors, investigations of tragic accidents employ 
Sentinel Event Review (SER), a systems-oriented approach utilizing analytic 
tools, like root cause analysis, to both look back to understand all the factors 
contributing to the event and look forward towards the kinds of systemic 
 
 28 After the Van Dyke trial, for example, Mayor Rahm Emanuel created the Chicago 
Police Accountability Task Force, which issued a scathing report on April 13, 2016. Monica 
Davey & Mitch Smith, Chicago Police Dept. Plagued by Systemic Racism, Task Force 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/us/chicago-
police-dept-plagued-by-systemic-racism-task-force-finds.html [https://perma.cc/EH 
S3-KT8G]. The Department of Justice also initiated an investigation, publishing its report, 
equally critical, in January 2017. Rebecca Hersher, DOJ: ‘Severely Deficient Training’ Has 
Led to Pattern of Abuse by Chicago Police, NPR (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/13/509646186/doj-severely-deficient-training-has-led-
to-pattern-of-abuse-by-chicago-police [https://perma.cc/73UG-CQZW]. In April 2016, 
the City of Chicago indicated it would move toward signing a consent decree for court-
supervised police reform. Jonah Newman, Five Things to Watch as CPD Consent Decree 
Moves Forward, CHI. REP. (July 27, 2018), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/five-
things-to-watch-as-cpd-consent-decree-moves-forward/ [https://perma.cc/69VM-96 
B3]. But all these efforts stalled when former Attorney General Jeffrey Sessions stated that 
he would not enforce such consent decrees. Aamer Madhani, Federal Judge Approves 
Consent Decree to Reform Chicago Police Department, USA TODAY (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/01/31/chicago-police-department 
-consent-decree-reforms-attorney-general-lisa-madigan/2734415002/ [https://perma 
.cc/63W2-CTHW]. In August 2017, former Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan filed a 
federal lawsuit seeking court ordered police reform in Chicago. Id. Finally, nearly two years 
later, a federal judge approved a plan calling for policy changes, noting that the process of 
reform won’t be easy or swift.” Dan Hinkel, Judge Approves Historic Court Order Aimed at 
Reforming Chicago Police Department: ‘Let Us Begin’, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-chicago-police-oversight-dec 
ree-20190131-story.html [https://perma.cc/GWQ8-S8TV]. The city’s main police union, 
the Chicago Fraternal Order of Police, was the most vocal opponent of the reform plan. Id. 
For a discussion of the inadequacy of administrative reviews and civilian oversight board 
reviews for preventative reform, see John Hollway et al., Root Cause Analysis: A Tool to 
Promote Officer Safety and Reduce Officer Involved Shootings over Time, 62 VILL. L. REV. 
882, 893–94 (2017). 
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reforms that could mitigate the chances of recurrence.29 In aviation, SER is 
credited with dramatically increasing safety: there has been no major airline 
accident involving an American commercial airplane since 2009.30 In the 
healthcare field, systems-oriented review has led to a drastic reduction of certain 
kinds of accidents and errors because of its focus on systems solutions rather 
than on reducing human error.31 
In Part II, drawing on the seminal work of Charles Perrow,32 I argue that we 
must see police shootings not only as human-caused actions but as “systems 
accidents,” meaning that they involve unanticipated interaction of multiple 
failures in a complex system. I show how police departments are the kinds of 
complex, “tightly bound” organizations that Perrow shows are especially 
susceptible to system failures.  
Perrow advanced our understanding of the kinds of organizations most 
susceptible to system failure but did not offer strategies for how to implement 
post-failure investigations in ways that could prevent future tragedies. This work 
was pioneered by James Reason.33 He applied an early version of root cause 
analysis (RCA), which has helped investigators understand the latent conditions 
underlying such system failures. I discuss Reason’s work in Part III, exploring 
its application to aviation accidents and medical mistakes. This Part ends with a 
discussion of early applications of root cause analysis (systems review) to 
wrongful convictions and other criminal justice errors. 
In Part IV, in an effort to make the concept of RCA more three-dimensional, 
I apply this analytical tool to the tragic shooting of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice 
 
 29 See Sentinel Events Initiative, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nij.gov/topics/justice-system/Pages/sentinel-events.aspx [https://perma 
.cc/AZ8V-XZ9J]. 
 30 Leslie Josephs, The Last Fatal U.S. Airline Crash Was a Decade Ago. Here’s Why 
Our Skies Are Safer, CNBC (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13 
/colgan-air-crash-10-years-ago-reshaped-us-aviation-safety.html [https://perma.cc/ 
T7GU-CM6G]. 
 31 See, e.g., PETER PRONOVOST & ERIC VOHR, SAFE PATIENTS, SMART HOSPITALS 24–
51 (2010) (describing how checklists reduced the risk of central line infections to “nearly 
zero”); see also ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO—HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT 
7−8 (2009) (discussing how a simple checklist can reduce surgery deaths and complications). 
See generally SUZANNE GORDON ET AL., BEYOND THE CHECKLIST: WHAT ELSE HEALTH 
CARE CAN LEARN FROM AVIATION TEAMWORK AND SAFETY (2013). 
 32 See generally PERROW, supra note 19.  
 33 James Reason was a Professor of Psychology at the University of Manchester starting 
in 1977, where he continues as Professor Emeritus. Reason has published multiple important 
articles and books on human error and organizational processes, including most importantly, 
HUMAN ERROR (1990) [hereinafter REASON, HUMAN ERROR], MANAGING THE RISKS OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS (1997) [hereinafter REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS], and ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS REVISITED (2016). For a 
general description of Reason’s work, see James T. Reason, SAFETYLEADERS, 
http://safetyleaders.org/superpanel/superpanel_james_reason.html  [https://perma.cc/ 
35FM-JLCX] [hereinafter Reason, SAFETYLEADERS]. 
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by an officer of the Cleveland Division of Police in November 2014.34 Here I 
demonstrate how the insights from this kind of structured analysis can lead to 
systems solutions. Full success, though, rests on applying RCA not only to 
individual incidents but also to large-scale data records that can help us find 
patterns of mistakes across multiple, similar incidents. 
In Part V, I supply an overview of the promise of systems-oriented review 
in policing, including the use of data-informed analysis to look for repeated 
causal patterns in police shootings. 
Finally, Part VI briefly concludes.  
II. POLICE VIOLENCE AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEM 
Police-involved shootings almost always give rise to investigations or 
litigation targeting the individual officer who fired the shots. This seems like an 
obvious result. It was, after all, this officer who decided to approach or confront 
the suspect. It was he who determined that deadly force was necessary. He is 
the one who raised his gun and pulled the trigger. This way of thinking reflects 
the way we generally think about issues of causation: we tend to look at the most 
proximate causer. 
Lawsuits and prosecutions against the person who did the shooting also 
express a legitimate demand that justice be done. Police officers’ power to take 
a human life is an awesome and terrible power. When that power is applied 
against an unarmed person or against someone who arguably posed no risk to 
police, there is understandable grief, sorrow, and moral outrage. Beyond the 
tragedy of a lost life, the suspect’s family and community may believe that 
police acted carelessly or even maliciously. In many communities there is a 
history of police violence or illegality by police officers, particularly against 
racial or cultural minorities.35 There is suspicion that police, investigators, and 
governmental officials will not tell the truth about what really happened. 
Communities rely on legal actions to get the real story out, to make sure that 
someone is held accountable, to make sure that justice is done for the victim and 
his family, to get bad or dangerous cops off the streets—all in hopes that 
lawsuits will keep police from taking other innocent lives in the future.36 
Enforcing individual culpability reflects Western culture’s deep 
commitment to the idea that human beings have agency and act voluntarily. Our 
entire criminal justice system is premised on the belief that human beings can 
justifiably be held accountable for their bad behavior. Even though we know 
 
 34 See Heisig, supra note 9. 
 35 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 16 (2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/ 
documents/3009376/BPD-Findings-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NXZ-
F3TT] (outlining, among other incidents, a history of racially motivated civil rights 
violations by the Baltimore Police). 
 36 See generally SIDNEY DEKKER, JUST CULTURE 90–91 (2d ed. 2012) (describing the 
role of lawsuits). 
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that criminal conduct is not entirely “voluntary” in a deeper sense—poverty, 
past abuse, mental illness and other factors contribute to the likelihood of 
criminal conduct—criminal sanctions fall on the voluntary acts of the final 
human actor, the last “cause” in the chain.37 This way of thinking also reflects a 
deep human need to find someone to blame for harmful or tragic circumstances. 
The need to identify causes is fundamental to human nature; not being able to 
find a cause is deeply disturbing because it signals a loss of control:38  
Without a cause, there is nothing to fix. And, with nothing to fix, things could 
go terribly, randomly wrong again—with us on the receiving end this time. 
Having a criminal justice system deliver us stories that clearly carve out the 
disordered from order, that excise evil from good, deviant from normal, is 
about creating some of the order that was lost in the disruption of the bad 
event.39 
Ironically, the sense of order we get from blaming individual bad 
performance—the belief that blaming will bring change—is an illusion when it 
comes to harms involving complex organizations. Several decades of research 
on “organizational accidents” demonstrates that so-called “active causes” by 
“sharp end” actors—pilots, airline mechanics, surgeons, equipment operators—
are only a small part of the causal story.40 Sharp end actors inherit situations and 
circumstances with latent failures and errors inherent in them.41 It is the 
combination of active errors and latent weaknesses that predominantly explains 
harmful results in complex systems.42 Sadly, addressing only active causes, 
through lawsuits and prosecutions against individual actors, does not ultimately 
result in a reduction in harmful accidents. If, as I argue below, policing involves 
a complex system within the meaning of the organizational accident literature, 
the current reliance on lawsuits and prosecutions in police-involved shootings 
is at best inadequate, and at worst counterproductive. 
 
 
 37 That human beings gravitate toward blaming immediate, human causes rather than 
“systems causes” is reflected in what psychologists call the fundamental attribution error: 
People consistently blame bad performance and bad outcomes by other people on their 
personal inadequacies rather than on situations beyond their control. By contrast, people 
blame their own bad performance on situational factors. See generally Patrick Healy, The 
Fundamental Attribution Error: How It Affects Your Organization and How to Overcome It, 
HARV. BUS. SCH. ONLINE (June 8, 2017), https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/the-
fundamental-attribution-error [https://perma.cc/FM5H-UYFM]. 
 38 DEKKER, supra note 36, at 151 (citing FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE 
IDOLS: OR HOW TO PHILOSOPHIZE WITH A HAMMER (1889)). 
 39 Id. at 152.  
 40 See, e.g., James Reason, Understanding Adverse Events: Human Factors, 4 QUALITY 
HEALTH CARE 80, 80 (1995). 
 41 Id. at 83.  
 42 Id. at 84. 
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A. Complexity and Organizational Accidents 
In 1979, reactor No. 2 of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station 
near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania partially melted down, causing the most serious 
radiation leak in the history of the U.S. commercial power plant industry.43 The 
accident resulted in multiple investigations, commissions, books, articles, and 
lawsuits all seeking to understand what went wrong.44 The accident and the 
desire to identify its causes inspired Charles Perrow’s seminal book with the 
counterintuitive title “Normal Accidents.”45 Perrow argued that where high-risk 
technologies are involved, some accidents are “inevitable,” no matter how 
effective are conventional safety devices.46 This has to do with the way failures 
in the system can interact and the way systems are tied together.47 Importantly, 
he argues, this “interactive complexity” is a characteristic of the system, not the 
operator.48  
The key to safety in complex systems is to focus on the “properties of 
systems themselves, rather than on the errors that owners, designers, and 
operators make in running them.”49 Perrow faulted conventional accident 
explanations for focusing solely on such causes as “operator error; faulty design 
or equipment; lack of attention to safety features; lack of operating experience; 
inadequately trained persons; failure to use advanced technology; [or] systems 
that are too big, underfinanced, or poorly run.”50 He argued that this myopic 
attention to individual failures or weaknesses misses important insights about 
the way risks interact and the way complex, nonlinear systems function.51 As I 
explain more fully below, systems that are “complex” and “tightly coupled” 
rather than “linear” and “loosely coupled” are the most susceptible to systems 
accidents of the sort that occurred at Three Mile Island.  
Additional catastrophes in the 1980s involving complex, technological 
operations52 brought increased attention to Perrow’s work on systems accidents, 
including a focus on human failures in such systems.53 Whereas fifty years ago 
 
 43 PERROW, supra note 19, at 15. 
 44 Id. at 16. 
 45 See generally id. 
 46 Id. at 3. 
 47 Id. at 4.  
 48 Id.  
 49 PERROW, supra note 19, at 63.  
 50 Id. 
 51 Id.  
 52 Incidents included the Bhopal methyl isocyanate tragedy of 1984, the Challenger and 
Chernobyl disasters of 1986, the capsize of the Herald of the Free Enterprise, the King’s 
Cross tube station fire in 1987, and the Piper Alpha oil platform explosion in 1988. Detailed 
analyses of these and other catastrophic accidents led to an increasing awareness that “latent 
errors” as opposed to active human errors “pose the greatest threat to the safety of a complex 
system.” See REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 33, at 173.  
 53 Theoretical and methodological developments in cognitive psychology also spurred 
interest in the study of human error. See id. at 50.  
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investigations of a major tragedy, such as a plane crash, would have ended by 
identifying the “proximal cause” at the “sharp end” of the causal chain, i.e., pilot 
error, today neither investigations nor organizational leaders would end there. 
Today it is understood that rather than being the “main instigators” of a harmful 
incident, operators (even those contributing their own mistakes) inherit system 
defects resulting from preexisting conditions such as poor design, faulty 
installation or maintenance, inadequate supervision, or bad management 
decisions.54 Thus even culpable operators add “the final garnish to a lethal brew 
whose ingredients have already been long in the cooking.”55 Moreover, the 
category of “human factors” encompasses much more than those associated 
with the “front-line operation of a system.”56 Increasingly, experts agree that 
attempts to discover and neutralize system defects may have a greater beneficial 
effect upon system safety than will localized efforts to minimize active errors.57 
The implications of this organizational literature for safety in policing are 
profound. The point is not that safety cannot be improved at the operator level, 
but that improving safety at that level will never solve the problem if latent 
defects and failures plague the entire system. While individual prosecutions and 
lawsuits are important for accomplishing other goals, they may be the wrong 
avenue for achieving what we all want the most: fewer police shootings. 
B. Policing as a Complex System 
According to Perrow, the kind of system that is most likely to have a systems 
accident is one that is complex (as opposed to linear) and tightly (as opposed to 
loosely) coupled.58 The first variable captures the relative interactiveness of the 
system: do its parts interact in a simple, linear fashion or do the parts serve 
multiple functions, interacting in a more complex way?59 Linear interactions 
overwhelmingly predominate in all systems; even the most complex systems 
comprise mostly linear, planned, visible interactions.60 Conversely, while all 
organizations have many parts that interact with each other, the key determinant 
of a complex system is whether these interactions are expected and obvious, or 
unexpected and hidden.61  
The consummate example of a linear system is manufacturing, specifically 
ordinary assembly-line production.62 The equipment in the production line is 
 
 54 Id. at 173. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 174. 
 57 Id. at 173. 
 58 See PERROW, supra note 19, at 4. 
 59 Id. at 78. 
 60 Id. at 75. 
 61 Id. Even the most linear systems will have at least one source of complex interactions: 
the environment in which the system operates. Id. 
 62 See id. at 86–87. 
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spread out and the steps are discrete and sequential.63 A failed component can 
easily be segregated.64 There are few unintended or unknown feedback loops in 
the process.65 Sources of information about the functioning of the system tend 
to be direct and straightforward.66 Personnel on a simple production line are 
usually generalists who can rotate, bid on various jobs, or fill in for other 
people.67 Another example of a linear system is a trade school, where classes 
are taken in sequence.68 
By contrast, complex systems tend to have unexpected connections and 
interactions that were not intended or built into the system, and that operators 
could not fully anticipate or guard against.69 A nuclear power plant is a good 
example of a complex system.70 Unlike assembly line manufacturing, 
equipment in a complex system is tightly spaced and not linear.71 Components 
are not in a production sequence and they often have multiple modes of 
connection with other components.72 There are unfamiliar, sometimes 
“unintended feedback loops.”73 Information sources about how the system is 
functioning are often “indirect and inferential.”74 Operators and other personnel 
tend to be specialists, and there is very little substitutability among jobs.75 
Another, somewhat different example of a complex system, and one more 
like a police department, is a university. Universities have multiple functions: 
classroom teaching, vocational training, research, public service, etc. These 
interact in unexpected, synergistic, creative, or disruptive ways. Consider, for 
example, what might happen if university administrators deny tenure to a 
popular teacher allegedly because her research did not measure up. The tenure 
denial might spark protests by students who highly value her classroom 
teaching. It might also engender insecurity among other untenured faculty, who 
worry that their research will be found wanting. In addition, imagine the teacher 
runs a public service program that is well-known and valued in the community. 
The mayor and other community leaders are up in arms that the program might 
be terminated. The local paper covers the story and some private donors threaten 
to withdraw their financial support for the university if the case is not 
 
 63 See id. 
 64 See PERROW, supra note 19, at 86–87. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 93–94. 
 69 See id. at 78. 
 70 For a detailed description of the complex, nonlinear way in which the accident at 
Three Mile Island occurred, see PERROW, supra note 19, at 15–31.  
 71 See id. at 83.  
 72 Id. at 82–83. 
 73 Id. at 82. 
 74 Id. at 83. 
 75 Id. at 87. 
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reconsidered. The failure to tenure one teacher has produced a whole set of 
unexpected results and problems for university administrators.76 
Despite being complex, however, a university is “loosely” rather than 
“tightly” coupled. This is the second determining variable for the likelihood of 
systems accidents. “Tight coupling” is a mechanical term used by engineers, 
which means that there is no “slack or buffer or give between two items.”77 In 
other words, whatever happens in one automatically and directly affects what 
happens in the other.78  
Tightly coupled systems have certain characteristics that make them more 
susceptible to systems accidents.79 Because complex systems do not tolerate 
delay and must proceed in particular and invariant sequences, they are unable to 
handle failures and errors without serious consequences.80 Tightly coupled 
systems have very little flexibility.81 Their overall design permits only one way 
to reach the production goal. “Quantities must be precise; resources cannot be 
substituted for one another; wasted supplies may overload the process; failed 
equipment entails a shutdown because the temporary substitution of other 
equipment is not possible.”82 One of the most important differences between 
tightly and loosely coupled systems is the inability of the former to recover from 
failures.83 In loosely coupled systems there is a better chance that spur-of-the-
moment fixes and substitutions can be found even if not planned ahead of 
time.84 By contrast, in complex systems buffers, redundancies and substitutions 
cannot be improvised but must be created in advance.85  
Returning to the university example, Perrow argues that while universities 
are complex, they are loosely rather than tightly coupled.86 In the case of the 
fired teacher, he says, there is ample slack (and time) to limit the impact of the 
negative tenure decision.87 For example, administrators can meet with students 
to hear their complaints and explain the reasons for the tenure decision. Students 
can be invited into the process of interviewing a new scholar for the department. 
Faculty can be given clear guidelines about future research requirements. 
Community members can be reassured that someone will take over the running 
of the public service program. Funders can be educated about the careful process 
 
 76 This example is drawn, with some adaptations, from PERROW, supra note 19, at 98–
99. 
 77 Id. at 90. 
 78 Sociologists and psychologists adopted the term in the mid-1970s to describe 
whether a particular remedial program was tightly (or only loosely) correlated with intended 
changes in the behavior of students. See id. 
 79 See id. at 94. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See id. 
 82 PERROW, supra note 19, at 94.  
 83 See id. at 95. 
 84 See id. 
 85 Id. at 94–95. 
 86 Id. at 98. 
 87 See id. at 99. 
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followed in the tenure decision.88 These actions have the potential to prevent 
harmful fallout from a controversial tenure decision.  
Applying these insights to law enforcement, it seems clear that policing is 
more like a university than it is like a linear manufacturing line. The policing 
context has a high level of interactive complexity. Police organizations have 
many goals and tasks; for example, investigating crimes, preventing crimes, 
promoting public safety, enforcing traffic laws, responding to citizen reports and 
complaints, conducting public welfare checks, leading educational programs in 
schools and other institutions, and taking mentally ill people into protective 
custody. In addition, policing priorities may be affected by city officials seeking 
to use law enforcement to raise money through increased ticket writing or by 
penalties or promotion metrics that reward aggressive policing.  
These goals, actions and priorities intersect in complicated ways. Moreover, 
complexity arises whenever police officers face circumstances, citizen 
responses, or reactions by fellow officers that are unexpected or unanticipated.89 
When a police officer stops a driver with a broken tail light, or knocks on a door 
to execute a search warrant, or answers a public welfare call, the officer cannot 
be certain of the circumstances that await him. A welfare check can lead to an 
investigation or arrest for illegal activity. An automobile stop for a minor 
offense can result in threatened or perceived force by a suspect, a fatal shooting, 
and riots in the surrounding community. Police responding to a call regarding a 
mentally ill person face unique uncertainties requiring unique skills. Multiple 
officers responding to an emergency may have difficulty communicating their 
intentions, coordinating their actions, or anticipating their interactions. That 
police have multiple, intersecting and sometimes conflicting goals and function 
in an uncertain, rapidly changing environment means that failures and mistakes 
take uncertain paths that are difficult to anticipate and often impossible to 
manage or control.  
While policing is like a university in its complexity, it is unlike a university 
in that policing is a much more tightly coupled system, meaning that there is 
very little slack for correcting mistakes before they result in harm. Recall our 
 
 88 On the other hand, consider the series of events that followed the forced resignation 
of a popular university president by a subgroup of the board of visitors of that institution. 
See Richard Pérez-Peña, Ousted Head of University Is Reinstated in Virginia, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 26, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/education/university-of-virg 
inia-reinstates-ousted-president.html [https://perma.cc/RTS9-2MU5]. The resignation 
resulted in student and faculty protests and marches, a statement by the faculty senate 
decrying the actions and demanding the president’s reinstatement, a meeting of the full board 
of visitors, reactions by the state legislature that partially funds the school, weigh-in by the 
governor, eventual reinstatement of the president, and investigation of the governance of the 
university by the higher education accrediting body. Id. No one could have predicted this 
series of events! In certain circumstances, it seems, even relatively loosely coupled systems 
can sometimes suffer systems accidents. (I do not mean to suggest that the reinstatement of 
the University of Virginia’s president was itself a mistake.)  
 89 See Lawrence W. Sherman, Reducing Fatal Police Shootings as Systems Crashes: 
Research, Theory, and Practice, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 421, 435 (2018). 
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example of the teacher not granted tenure. While tight coupling occurs on a 
continuum, as a general matter, university administrators can anticipate fallout 
from a potentially unpopular decision, and they have time and opportunity to 
intervene against harmful consequences. By contrast, circumstances in the 
policing context tend to be fast-moving, uncertain, and unpredictable, making it 
very difficult to intervene once potentially hazardous events have been set in 
motion. Officers have little time to think and limited options to act in the heat 
of the moment. Whatever constructive actions police are able to take in such 
circumstances will depend upon reflex actions, training, and discipline rather 
than reasoned intervention to address the particular system breakdown at hand. 
These distinctions become vitally important when designing preventative 
measures to address harm-causing incidents in policing.90 
Police face at least two “production pressures” that contribute to the tight 
coupling that characterizes law enforcement.91 The first is the pressure to “move 
on”; to finish each policing task quickly and proceed to the next. Police officers 
experience a constant pressure to triage their time, always wondering whether 
they should be answering another call or helping out their colleagues at another 
location, and worrying that they will be judged by their peers for taking too 
much time with any particular task. According to police scholar Lawrence 
Sherman, this results in a “dominant occupational culture” best described as 
“urgency,” the perceived need to finish each task quickly and resume “readiness 
to provide immediate assistance elsewhere to those who need it most.”92 The 
second production pressure is the necessity to “contain risk.”93 This pressure is 
created by the tight coupling between the behavior of non-compliant citizens 
and the potential risks such behavior poses to the officer and others.94 Both 
production pressures create incentives to move in quickly and to move in 
close.95 In turn, both of these actions increase the tightness of coupling in the 
social system by escalating the situation and reducing the possibilities for 
preventing harm.96 
C. Accident Prevention in Complex Systems 
That policing is a relatively complex and tightly coupled system means that 
it is especially susceptible to organizational or systems accidents.97 A systems 
 
 90 See infra Part II.C. 
 91 Sherman, supra note 89, at 436. By production pressure, I mean the pressure to 
complete the job of producing the product at issue. In policing the “product” is public 
safety—or more narrowly, responding to all challenges to public safety—rather than 
widgets. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id.  
 96 Id. 
 97 See Sherman, supra note 89, at 434. 
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accident “involve[s] the unanticipated interaction of multiple failures” in a 
complex system.98 While such an accident may have one active proximal 
cause—such as a pilot or air traffic controller whose error resulted in a plane 
crash—it has many other, latent causes that interacted in complex and 
unanticipated ways with the errors of the operator.99 In this way of thinking, the 
erring operator is usually best thought of not as an instigator of the accident but 
as an inheritor of preexisting system defects, such as faulty design, installation, 
maintenance, and management.100  
Some latent defects are traceable to human error, but others are more 
difficult to attribute.101 Latent defects contribute to the potential of accidents by 
increasing the likelihood of active failures, for example, by increasing the 
potential for errors or violations, or by aggravating the consequences of unsafe 
acts.102 Importantly, these system defects were in place before the accident 
sequence began.103 They are weak spots whose accident-causing potential is 
generally kept in check.104 But these preexisting weaknesses can combine with 
external circumstances to bring about a catastrophic incident.105  
The organizational accident literature leads to some important insights that 
should frame our thinking about solutions to accidents in complex systems, 
including policing. First, the tendency to identify as the sole or primary causer 
of an accident the proximal, active causer—usually a front-line operator—is 
woefully inadequate if the purpose is to prevent future accidents.106 Ironically, 
to the extent an accident resulted from the confluence of multiple factors that 
are unlikely to recur, a single-minded effort to prevent repetition of the same 
specific, active errors will do little to improve the safety of the system as a 
whole.107 Second, while it seems intuitive that it is easier to change human 
 
 98 PERROW, supra note 19, at 70. 
 99 REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 33, at 173. 
 100 Id. at 173–74. 
 101 See id. at 173. 
 102 REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS, supra note 33, at 
11. 
 103 Id. at 12. 
 104 See id. at 11. 
 105 See id. at 9. James Reason dubbed this the “Swiss cheese” theory of accident. Id. 
Imagine that you have a package of ten slices of Swiss cheese in an even stack. Although 
each of the pieces of cheese has multiple holes in it, you cannot put your eye to any one of 
the holes in the first slice and see through to the other side. The holes in each slice are in 
different places. Now imagine that each slice is a subpart or component of a complex system 
that would need to fail for an accident to occur. The holes are weak spots that predispose that 
particular component to fail in some way. The only way that the accident will occur is if all 
the holes are lined up so that all of the potential failures occur at the same time. In other 
words, the accident likely resulted from the unique confluence of multiple necessary, but 
singly insufficient factors. See id. 
 106 See REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 33, at 216. 
 107 Id. at 174. 
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beings than systems, scientific research suggests the opposite.108 While human 
error can be reduced to some extent by retraining, discipline, etc., it is inevitable 
that even the best-trained and most well-intentioned human beings will continue 
to make mistakes from time to time.109 Many sources of human error result from 
psychological factors such as inattention, mismanagement, forgetfulness, 
preoccupation, and anxiety, which are hard to control or eliminate.110 While we 
cannot completely eliminate human error, we can change the circumstances in 
which fallible human beings work, particularly the circumstances that increase 
the likelihood of operator error or aggravate the consequences of unsafe acts. 
III. PREVENTING ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 
As noted in Part II, accident investigations in the past tended to focus almost 
entirely on human operator errors and equipment failures. A series of 
catastrophic accidents, however, led investigators to recognize that many of the 
underlying causes of these incidents were latent within the system long before 
the active errors occurred.111 This led to the growing realization that “attempts 
to discover and neutralise these latent failures [could] have a greater beneficial 
effect upon system safety than . . . localised efforts to minimise active 
errors.”112 In particular, investigators realized that attempting to weed out or 
remove so-called “accident prone” human actors or “bad apples” was not the 
most effective strategy for preventing accidents.113 
James Reason is one of the pioneers of this theory of human error and 
organizational processes. His error classification and models of systems 
breakdown laid the groundwork for putting these ideas into practice across 
multiple domains, including commercial aviation, nuclear power generation, 
process plants, railways, marine operations, financial services, and healthcare 
organizations.114 His insights provided the scholarly architecture for the 
 
 108 REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS, supra note 33, at 
129. 
 109 Id. at 129. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 33, at 173. For a brief history of modern 
research on accidents and causation from the early 20th century into the 21st, demonstrating 
the move from single causes to multiple causes and from human causes to systems causes 
and nonblaming review, see generally THOMAS G.C. GRIFFIN ET AL., HUMAN FACTORS 
MODELS FOR AVIATION ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 26–56 (2015). 
 113 See SIDNEY DEKKER, THE FIELD GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING ‘HUMAN ERROR’ 11–13 
(3d ed. 2014). 
 114 See generally Armacost, supra note 15 (criticizing the “bad apple” explanation for 
police misconduct); REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 33 (examining human errors and 
the field of human error study); REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
ACCIDENTS, supra note 33 (discussing organizational accidents and how to manage the risks 
associated with them); REASON, ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS REVISITED, supra note 33 
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development of systemic accident reviews known as “sentinel event review” 
(SER) and “root cause analysis” (RCA).115 
A “sentinel event” is a “significant negative outcome that: [s]ignals 
underlying weaknesses in the system or process[;] [i]s likely the result of 
compound errors[; and m]ay provide, if properly analyzed and addressed, 
important keys to strengthening the system and preventing future adverse events 
or outcomes.”116 Sentinel event review often employs the tool of “root cause 
analysis” to identify what, how and why something happened, with the goal of 
preventing its recurrence.117  
RCA is designed to investigate and categorize the “root causes of events 
with safety, health, environmental, quality, reliability and production 
impacts.”118 The goal of RCA is to determine not only what and how an event 
happened, but also why it happened.119 Only by knowing the “why” can 
investigators identify “workable corrective measures that prevent future events 
of the type observed.”120 Identifying root causes requires the analyst to go 
behind the visible problem—usually the last causer—to identify first-level and 
second-level and third-level causes, i.e., causes that came before the most 
proximal, human causer.121 The overall goal of SER is to investigate significant, 
unexpected harm-causing events and to use the knowledge gained from the 
review to create barriers against future harm-causing errors.122  
 
(expanding upon developments in the field of organizational accidents). For a general 
description of Reason’s work, see Reason, SAFETYLEADERS, supra note 33. 
 115 As will be explained in more detail below, “root cause analysis,” which applies a 
linear investigative strategy in pursuit of just one cause, has been criticized as ineffective as 
a systems analysis tool. To the extent that RCA is applied in this narrow way, I agree with 
these criticisms; however, it can and often is employed much more broadly as one tool 
toward pursuit of systemic causes. In this Article, I assume the broader use of RCA. Risk 
management scholars and practitioners have created numerous frameworks for systems-
oriented accident review, but most seem to trace their origins to some version of Reason’s 
framework. 
 116 Sentinel Events Initiative, supra note 29.  
 117 See James J. Rooney & Lee N. Vanden Heuvel, Root Cause Analysis for Beginners, 
37 QUALITY BASICS 45, 45 (2004). American Society for Quality (ASQ) is a global, 
professional association that promotes the use of techniques to improve organizational 
quality. About ASQ, AM. SOC’Y FOR QUALITY (Sept. 4, 2019), https://asq.org/about-asq 
[https://perma.cc/4CMZ-4ZN3]. It has over 80,000 members in 150 countries. Id. ASQ 
provides its members with certification, training, publications, conferences, and other 
services. Id. 
 118 Rooney & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 117, at 45. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. Note that a root cause is one over which management has control and for which 
there is a workable solution. Id. at 46.  
 121 See generally id. 
 122 LEAH POPE & AYESHA DELANY-BRUMSEY, VERA INST. JUSTICE, CREATING A 
CULTURE OF SAFETY: SENTINEL EVENT REVIEWS FOR SUICIDE AND SELF-HARM IN 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 1 (Dec. 2016).  
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Traditional RCA was sometimes understood to involve a purely linear 
investigative strategy designed to find a single root cause that was local enough 
to be mitigated by the investigating institution or organization.123 These 
assumptions about the nature of RCA have led to vigorous criticism by 
organizational management scholars and practitioners.124 As applied by 
systems-oriented risk managers, RCA must not be so limited.125 It is understood 
and expected that investigation of an accident involving a complex system will 
reveal multiple, nonlinear chains that lead to multiple “root causes.” In addition, 
while incident-specific RCA continues to define a root cause as one over which 
management has control—to ensure that the resulting action plan can actually 
be implemented—organizational management scholars embrace a broader 
causal analysis. Systems-oriented review is designed to identify not only 
incident-specific and institution-specific causes, but also systems-wide causes 
that may involve broader patterns that transcend organizational and institutional 
boundaries. 
A. Lessons from Aviation 
This kind of systems-oriented review has been adopted and perfected in 
various industries, including in commercial aviation, nuclear energy, and 
medicine. Commercial aviation, which has enjoyed a dramatic increase in safety 
over the past few decades, is the poster child for the success of proactive, 
forward-looking, systems-oriented review of harm-causing incidents.126 Airline 
safety has improved in every decade since the 1950s.127 In 1959 an individual 
would have faced a chance of being in a fatal accident in one out of every 25,000 
departures.128 Today the odds of dying in an airline crash in the U.S. or 
European Union are calculated to be only 1 in 29 million.129 Even though the 
number of worldwide flight hours has doubled over the past 20 years—from 
approximately 25 million in 1993 to 54 million in 2013—in the same period the 
 
 123 See Rooney & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 117, at 48. 
 124 See, e.g., Mohammad Farhad Peerally et al., The Problem with Root Cause Analysis, 
26 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 417, 418 (2017). 
 125 As root cause analysis has long been associated with the kind of systems review 
advocated by organizational management scholar James Reason and investigators who 
follow his insights, it was never intended to describe a linear, single root cause strategy. 
While the term continues to be used, some scholars and practitioners have urged the 
alternative term “systems analysis” to avoid misunderstanding. In this Article, I use the term 
“root cause analysis” in this broader sense, to connote a structured, systems-oriented 
approach. 
 126 ALLIANZ, GLOBAL AVIATION SAFETY STUDY 4 (2014). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
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number of airflight-caused fatalities fell from approximately 450 to 250 per 
year.130  
This enormous increase in airline safety has resulted from a combination of 
factors, including dramatic improvements in aircraft engines and design as well 
as the advent of electronics, most notably the introduction of digital 
instruments.131 Higher standards of training for flight crews, improved air traffic 
technology, and better collision avoidance systems have also had an impact.132  
One of the most important factors generating the dramatic improvement in 
airline safety is that commercial aviation has a sophisticated program of 
systematic investigations of airline accidents, which is viewed as a model for 
other industries.133 Investigations come from two sources: under National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regulations, all “accidents” and certain 
“incidents” must be reported to the NTSB,134 which was established in 1967 to 
conduct independent investigations of all civil aviation accidents in the United 
States.135 The NTSB immediately sends a “go team” of investigators and 
specialists to the accident site to collect and analyze information.136 The team 
ultimately drafts a report for the Board, including safety recommendations based 
on the findings of the investigation.137 The issuance of safety recommendations 
is the most important part of the NTSB’s mandate, and may address deficiencies 
discovered during the investigation, even if they did not contribute to the 
accident.138 The Board is required to address safety issues immediately, often 
issuing safety recommendations before the investigation is complete.139 The 
final report, which contains details about the accident, analysis of the factual 
 
 130 Narinder Kapur et al., Aviation and Healthcare: A Comparative Review with 
Implications for Patient Safety, 7 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. OPEN 1, 1 (2015). 
 131 How Aviation Safety Has Improved, ALLIANZ, https://www.agcs.allianz.com/ 
news-and-insights/expert-risk-articles/how-aviation-safety-has-improved.html [https 
://perma.cc/MWH6-5QZN]. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 49 C.F.R. § 830.5 (2018). 
 135 See The Investigative Process, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, https://www.ntsb 
.gov/investigations/process/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/4S4G-EP8F].  
 136 Id. The NTSB “go team” consists of from three to four to as many as twelve or more 
specialists from the Board’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. who serve on a rotating basis. 
Id. Each of the “go team” investigators has a working group composed of experts in eight 
different areas of expertise—operations, structures, powerplants, systems, air traffic control, 
weather, human performance, and survival factors—and includes representatives from 
various stakeholder groups, including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the pilots 
and flight attendant’s unions, airframe and engine manufacturers, etc. Id. The team begins 
its investigation at the crash site (remaining for days or even weeks), continues its analysis 
at NTSB headquarters in Washington, D.C., and drafts a report that goes to the NTSB with 
safety recommendations. Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
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record, conclusions and the probable cause of the accident, and the related safety 
guidance, is posted on the NTSB website.140  
Since its creation, the NTSB has investigated more than 140,500 aviation 
accidents and issued thousands of safety recommendations, more than 73 
percent of which have been adopted in whole or in part by the entities to which 
they were directed.141 Although most NTSB reports focus on one accident, the 
NTSB also publishes reports that address deficiencies that are common to a set 
of similar accidents.142 As I explain in more detail below, this kind of pattern-
oriented analysis is essential to successful risk management. 
While investigation of airline accidents is crucial and can lead to forward-
looking safety recommendations, this learning comes only in the face of 
catastrophe. In addition, absent centralization and communication of findings, 
one-by-one accident investigation can obscure patterns of errors leading to 
repeated, similar accidents.143 This lesson was brought home to the airline 
industry in December 1974, when the flight crew of TWA Flight 514, inbound 
to Dulles Airport in a cloudy sky, misunderstood the clearance from traffic 
control and crashed into the Virginia mountains, killing everyone on the 
plane.144 Upon investigation, it was discovered that six weeks earlier, a United 
Airlines flight crew had experienced the same clearance misunderstanding and 
had only narrowly missed a similar crash during a nighttime approach.145 A 
warning notice had gone out to all United Airlines pilots, but there was no 
mechanism for communicating this information more widely.146 The creation of 
the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was the first step in establishing 
a national incident-reporting system, which proved crucial to continued 
advances in airline safety.147  
ASRS was designed by the FAA to analyze voluntarily submitted incident 
reports from pilots, air traffic controllers, dispatchers, cabin crew maintenance 
 
 140 Id.; see also Accident Reports, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, https://www.ntsb 
.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/AccidentReports.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
7JJU-L25M] (containing a dynamic list of accident reports, updated daily). 
 141 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2014 3 (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/2014_Annual_Report.pdf  [https://per 
ma.cc/6XVW-PXPE]. Despite its contributions, the NTSB has been the subject of various 
criticisms over the years. See, e.g., CYNTHIA C. LEBOW ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL 
JUSTICE, SAFETY IN THE SKIES: PERSONNEL AND PARTIES IN NTSB AVIATION ACCIDENT 
INVESTIGATIONS 23 (2000), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph  
_reports/2005/MR1122.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KAF-XR28].  
 142 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 141, at 3. 
 143 In addition, as aviation safety has continued to improve, there are fewer serious 
accidents to provide opportunities for continuous and significant improvements, making 
reporting of near misses and other incidents crucial.  
 144 This incident is described in STEPHEN K. CUSICK ET AL., COMMERCIAL AVIATION 
SAFETY 252 (6th ed. 2017). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
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crew, maintenance technicians and others.148 These reports identify hazardous 
or dangerous conditions recognized by ground-level practitioners and experts as 
posing risks to safety.149 In order to encourage voluntary reporting, reports sent 
to ASRS are held in strict confidence and may not be used by the FAA in 
enforcement actions against reporters.150 
From its inception in 1975, ASRS reporting has been robust, with an 
average intake of over 8000 reports every month, and over 1.5 million reports 
in its forty-three-year history.151 Each incident report is read and analyzed by at 
least two of ASRS’s corps of aviation safety experts, composed of experienced 
pilots, air traffic controllers, and mechanics.152 Their first priority is to flag any 
aviation hazards identified, and send an alerting message to the appropriate FAA 
office or aviation authority.153 The analysts then classify each report and 
uncover the causes underlying the reported incident.154 The original report and 
the expert’s observations are incorporated into the ASRS database.155 ASRS has 
also conducted over sixty research studies that seek to effect incremental 
improvement in aviation safety on a system-wide level.156 ASRS incident 
reports are viewed as one of the world’s largest sources of information on 
aviation safety and human factors.157 
The history of safety investigations in commercial aviation illustrates two 
moves that have become central features of risk management in industries as 
diverse as health care, nuclear power and banking. The first is the move from 
the reactive strategy that investigates only full-fledged accidents—the “fly-
 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See Confidentiality and Incentives to Report, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. 
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/confidentiali ty.html [https://perma 
.cc/LDN9-LEUQ]. The FAA has also elected to waive fines and penalties of unintentional 
violations of FAA statutes and regulations that are reported to ASRS, unless those violations 
involved criminal offenses or certain kinds of accidents. Id. (internal citation omitted); see 
also 14 C.F.R. § 91.25 (2018). 
 151 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYSTEM 
PROGRAM BRIEFING 13 (July 2019), https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/ASRS_Program 
Briefing.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B9T-PHEK]. The reports are received electronically and 
then stripped of all identifying information to preserve anonymity. Id. at 17–18.  
 152 This description of the investigation is taken from the Aviation Safety Reporting 
System website. Report Processing, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., 
https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/report.html [https://perma.cc/E9GP-3W2N]. ASRS 
distributes this information through safety alerts, publications, and database search requests. 
Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., supra note 151, at 21. 
 157 Id. at 15. In addition, every major airline maintains its own safety teams with 
experienced investigators who monitor flight safety and lead inquiries into circumstances 
that implicate safety concerns. See, e.g., CARL MACRAE, CLOSE CALLS: MANAGING RISK AND 
RESILIENCE IN AIRLINE FLIGHT SAFETY 27 (2014). 
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crash-fix-fly” approach158—to investigating close calls and near miss incidents 
as well.159 Historically, only the costliest and most harm-causing events were 
subjected to detailed investigation to determine causes and contributory 
factors.160 In current risk management practice, the whole range of procedural 
errors, human mistakes, and systems defects are routinely analyzed and 
investigated.161 “Incidents, or ‘near misses,’” can include instances in which 
only “partial penetration of defences” occurred or where “all the available 
safeguards were defeated but no actual losses were sustained.”162 The proactive 
approach includes actively looking for potential safety problems by analyzing 
trends, investigating hazards, and using other methods of scientific inquiry.163 
There are two potential benefits to looking at near misses, dangerous mistakes 
and closes calls as well as accidents: First, it provides insight into why some 
sequences of events result in accidents while other sequences do not.164 Second, 
this kind of investigation can uncover circumstances that pose dormant or 
hidden risks before those risks result in an accident.165  
The second important move in aviation safety management that has served 
as a model for other disciplines is the move from looking at accidents or 
incidents one by one, to looking for recurring patterns or risk factors. Aviation 
investigators constantly work to find “connections and interrelations between 
individual events” that suggest there is some “common, underlying risk.”166 
Their goal is to identify circumstances or events that appear symptomatic of 
some persistent organizational problem.167 The TWA incident described above 
 
 158 ALAN J. STOLZER ET AL., SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN AVIATION 13 (2008). 
Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia describe three levels of safety risk management: Reactive safety 
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is one example of this strategy, which linked the TWA crash to an almost 
identical near miss that had occurred just six weeks prior.168 In addition, 
proactive investigations of similar incidents or near misses can lead to discovery 
of dangerous conditions, safety hazards or jeopardous human conduct before a 
catastrophic accident occurs.169  
B. Sentinel Event Review in Medicine 
Systems-oriented, root cause analysis has also been applied with good 
results in medicine, although its use in this context is still evolving. Modern risk 
management in medicine looks to aviation as its precursor, but prior to applying 
the aviation model the medical profession employed an earlier version of 
multidisciplinary accident review.170 Hospitals have a long tradition of 
conducting “morbidity and mortality conferences” to review negative patient 
outcomes and medical errors to better understand how they occurred and how 
they could have been prevented.171 In early versions, however, these reviews 
were limited by their backward-looking, “blaming” approach.172 More recently 
safety management experts have looked to commercial aviation as a model for 
more forward-looking, systems-oriented review.173  
Salient parallels between aviation and medicine make the commercial 
airline model a good one.174 Physicians, like pilots, are highly educated for work 
in “high-risk environments,” they are often forced to make decisions under 
pressure, and they are “constantly reminded that their mistakes may cost human 
life.”175 Both function in complex settings where teams of experts interact with 
technology, and in both settings, threats to safety can come from a wide range 
of environmental sources.176 Also, in medicine as in aviation, safety is critical 
but financial concerns can affect the commitment of safety resources.177 
Scholars have also identified particular risk-management strategies used in 
aviation that are deemed transferable to the medical context, for example, 
aviation teamwork is suitable for adaptation to hospital operation rooms and 
 
 168 CUSICK ET AL., supra note 144, at 252. 
 169 See, e.g., id. at 490. 
 170 See, e.g., Kapur et al., supra note 130, at 1, 6. 
 171 See POPE & DELANY-BRUMSEY, supra note 122, at 2. 
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(listing references).  
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emergency departments, and the aviation safety reporting has served as a model 
for voluntary reporting of medical incidents.178 In addition, the use of checklists 
and redundancies, which have transformed aviation safety, have been employed 
to good effect in addressing particular recurrent errors in medicine.179 
An important event that led medicine out of old-school blaming review 
toward more forward-looking review was the 1999 U.S. Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) consensus report To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System.180 It 
reported the alarming statistic that 44,000 people died every year from 
preventable errors.181 The key insight of the report was that the majority of 
medical errors result not from mistakes by individuals but from “faulty systems, 
processes, and conditions that lead people to make mistakes or fail to prevent 
them;”182 in other words, from “bad systems rather than bad people.”183 This 
was a transformative concept for medical review of errors.184 It led the IOM to 
conclude that mistakes can best be prevented by designing the medical system 
to “make it harder for people to do something wrong and easier for them to do 
it right.”185 The IOM reasoned that “when an error occurs, blaming an individual 
does little to make the system safer and prevent someone else from committing 
the same error.”186 Its recommendations were designed to adopt a more 
“institutionalized approach that identifies root causes and underlying system 
failures,”187 with the goal of reducing medical errors by a minimum of 50% over 
the succeeding 5 years.188 
The Joint Commission, the oldest and largest standard-setting and 
accrediting body for healthcare organizations in the world,189 has since 
institutionalized a strategy for identifying and analyzing harm-causing medical 
 
 178 Id. at 782, 784.  
 179 See INST. OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 158, 
162, 171–72, 194 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]; Kapur et al., 
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report defines medical error as “the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended 
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MEDICAL ERROR 1 (2019).  
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 183 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 172, at 4.  
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errors and formulating action plans to prevent such harms from recurring.190 
Since 1996, the Commission has had in place a Sentinel Event Policy, which 
requires accredited organizations to conduct a systemic review of all sentinel 
events to determine causal and contributing causes and to formulate an action 
plan to promote greater safety going forward.191 A sentinel event is defined as a 
patient safety event (not primarily related to the natural course of the patient’s 
illness or underlying condition) that reaches a patient and results in death, 
permanent harm, or severe temporary harm.192 Such events are deemed 
“sentinel” because they signal that immediate investigation and response is 
needed.193 The goal of sentinel event review, using a revised version of root 
cause analysis called Root Cause Analysis and Action (RCA²), is to identify and 
implement “sustainable systems-based improvements” that improve patient 
safety.194 As virtually all U.S. hospitals and medical organizations are 
accredited by the Joint Commission, sentinel event review using RCA² has 
become the standard of safety for medical providers in this country.195 
RCA² seeks to improve traditional root cause analysis in two ways, first by 
emphasizing that investigation and analysis must be followed by a concrete 
action plan, and second by prescribing that analysis and implementation must 
focus on systems-oriented change.196 Specifically, RCA² is designed to identify 
and mitigate “system vulnerabilities” rather than individual errors, on the theory 
that individual performance is a “symptom” of broader, systems-based 
problems.197 Human error simpliciter is never an acceptable root cause because 
disciplining or retraining a human causer may reduce the risk that the errant 
actor will repeat his mistake, but it will not reduce the probability that the event 
 
 190 See Sentinel Event Policy and Procedures, JOINT COMMISSION, https://www.joint 
commission.org/sentinel_event_policy_and_procedures/  [https://perma.cc/ER2R-MF 
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overall goal of robust investigations of harm-causing events is a “culture of safety.” U.S. 
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will recur with other operators in similar circumstances.198 Thus the strongest, 
most effective actions are systems-wide interventions that reduce the inevitable 
risk that well-trained and well-intentioned human operators will make mistakes. 
Strong, systems-oriented actions include architectural/physical plant changes, 
engineering control, simplification of processes, and standardization of 
equipment.199 The weakest actions are those directed at directly changing 
human behavior, such as double checks, warnings, new procedures and re-
training.200 
Sentinel event, systems-oriented review in medicine has not yet reached the 
high level of success it has reached in aviation. The reasons for some of its 
failures in medicine hold important lessons for systems-oriented review in the 
criminal justice context. One determinative difference between aviation and 
medicine has to do with the organizational culture of the two contexts with 
regard to safety: over the past twenty years, aviation has developed a “non-
blaming” culture in which incident reporting has become more routine and less 
threatening.201 In addition, aviation is less hierarchical than medicine, which 
makes joint-responsibility for safety less threatening and more likely.202 
Commitment to safety permeates all levels of the business of airlines, whereas 
safety in medicine continues to be regarded as a specialized priority for some 
but not the obligation of all.203 Finally, organizational culture in some medical 
institutions continues to be a culture of “low expectations,” in which medical 
personnel fail to correct discrepancies, mistakes and inconsistencies.204 If 
medical personnel come to expect that they will receive faulty or incomplete 
information, it may lead them to conclude that “red flags” are not unusual or 
worrisome.205 They may come to regard them as only repetitions of the poor 
communication to which they have become accustomed.206  
 
C. The Importance of Multi-Incident Review 
Sentinel event review of particular, harm-causing events has been an 
essential feature of systems review in commercial aviation and in medicine. As 
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described above, the NTSB requires the investigation of all airline accidents and 
near misses and the Joint Commission requires that hospitals review all “sentinel 
events.”207  
The dramatic success of systems-oriented analysis in these contexts, 
however, lies in accident investigation that goes beyond single incident review. 
Commercial aviation and medical investigators have increasingly used the 
information gleaned from individual reviews to identify patterns of repeated, 
similar errors that were found to have caused repeated, similar accidents.208 In 
turn, pattern identification has led the way for systems-oriented interventions 
that have had enormous success in changing the circumstances that lead to 
predictable, repeated human errors in these contexts.209 
Single incident analysis is essential for identifying the lines of causation that 
uncover the root causes of a particular accident. Employed alone, however, 
single incident analysis has limited value. Focusing solely on individual events 
may frustrate an institution’s ability to appreciate its vulnerability to reoccurring 
harmful errors, some of which may result from easy-to-identify systems causes. 
Failing to see these easy fixes is to miss the lowest hanging fruit. By contrast, 
identifying patterns of errors and sharing information among similarly situated 
institutions or agencies promotes the most efficient and effective investigation 
of harm-causing events. In addition, prioritizing the investigation of reoccurring 
errors avoids the risk of investing inordinate resources to prevent a rare event, 
which may be unlikely to reoccur. In short, investigating and addressing 
reoccurring errors—by looking at both harmful events and near misses—has 
huge payoffs for accident reduction. 
D. Sentinel Event Review in Criminal Justice 
In 2004, twenty-one-year-old Michael Bell was shot in the head by officers 
of the Kenosha (Wisconsin) Police Department.210 Michael had driven home 
from an evening out and pulled up to the curb at his home when police pulled 
up behind him.211 There is no dispute that Michael was unarmed, but the events 
that led to the shooting were outside the range of the officers’ dashcam and 
 
 207 See How Aviation Safety Has Improved, supra note 131; Sentinel Event Policy and 
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stop-police-accident.html [https://perma.cc/798F-3JWT]. 
 211 Id. Police claimed that because Michael “failed to make a complete stop,” they 
followed him to his house and parked behind him. Id. Toxicology screens later demonstrated 
that Michael had been drinking that night. Id. Michael had tangled with one of the three 
officers sometime before, and was scheduled to appear in court the next day in connection 
with charges from that incident. Appendix to the Affidavit of Russell Beckman Regarding 
the Circumstances Surrounding the Possession of the Handgun of Officer Eric Strausbaugh 
During the Encounter with Michael E. Bell at 38 [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]. 
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details were disputed.212 What is now clear, however, is that while three officers 
were trying to subdue Michael against a police vehicle, one yelled, “He’s got 
my gun,” and moments later a fellow officer shot Michael point blank in the 
head.213  
After the incident, Michael’s father, Michael Bell, Sr., who is a retired 
lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force and familiar with NTSB investigations 
of airline accidents, assumed that there would be a similar, detailed, independent 
investigation of his son’s death.214 Instead, the Kenosha police department 
internal affairs unit spent only 48 hours investigating the incident before 
concluding that the shooting was justified.215 The investigation was apparently 
conducted without interviewing witnesses or waiting for the forensic evidence 
to come back from the crime lab.216  
When the forensic reports came back, and Michael’s fingerprints and DNA 
were not found on the officer’s gun, Mr. Bell, Sr. hired his own investigators, 
including a retired police detective from the Kenosha Police Department.217 In 
the course of this investigation, the detective discovered evidence suggesting 
that the officer’s holstered handgun may have gotten caught in the driver’s side 
mirror—found to be broken at the base—which caused the tugging the officer 
interpreted as an effort to disarm him.218 
In comparing the vigorous investigations of airline accidents to the less 
independent and comparatively anemic investigations of many police shootings 
by their departments, Mr. Bell, Sr. was raising an important question: Does 
aviation have something to teach the criminal justice system about how to 
investigate harm-causing accidents with an eye toward preventing such events 
in the future? Significantly, Mr. Bell, Sr. did not blame the officer who fired the 
shot, concluding that he made an “honest mistake” in thinking that Michael had 
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ahold of the officer’s gun.219 What Mr. Bell objected to was the fact that the 
department failed to conduct a thorough investigation that took seriously all 
available evidence.220 Instead it stopped with the conclusion that the shot was 
“justified.”221 A rigorous, systems-oriented sentinel event review of these 
circumstances would have gone behind the officer’s mistake to determine why 
that mistake occurred. If the gun got caught on the side mirror, did that suggest 
an equipment design failure? Did it implicate an addressable vulnerability in the 
way the officer positioned himself so that his gun holster got caught? Was the 
initial stop justified? Could de-escalation techniques been used to diffuse the 
situation? Could Michael have been ticketed rather than arrested, in order to 
avoid the escalation that occurred? These kinds of questions could uncover 
systems vulnerabilities that could be addressed to make a similar shooting less 
likely to occur in the future. In other words, that the shooting may have been 
reasonable (lawful) at the moment the shot was fired222 does not preclude a 
finding that there were ways it could have been prevented. The list of questions 
I have outlined suggest there may have been systems vulnerabilities that 
contributed to the shooting. This is the great benefit of independent, 
nonblaming, systems-oriented review.  
Criminal justice scholars have begun to recognize the promise of systems-
oriented review.223 Initial interest was spurred by the U.S. Justice Department’s 
landmark 1998 study of the first twenty-eight wrongful convictions exposed by 
DNA testing224 and the growing number of such cases that were catalogued by 
the first Innocence Project.225 
More recently, the National Institute of Justice226 has launched the Sentinel 
Events Initiative (SEI) to explore whether the same forward looking, all-
stakeholders, multi-disciplinary, nonblaming review employed in medicine, 
aviation and other contexts could be used to address sentinel events in the 
criminal justice system.227 NIJ defines a sentinel event as an “unexpected 
negative outcome” that signals a possible weakness in the system and is likely 
caused by “compound errors.”228 Such an event may provide, “if properly 
 
 219 Kennedy, supra note 210. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 I take no position on the question of whether the shooting was lawful at the moment 
it occurred. 
 223 See, e.g., Hollway et al., supra note 28, at 884. 
 224 See generally EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY 
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996). 
 225 For a discussion of this history, see generally James M. Doyle, Learning from Error 
in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010). 
 226 The National Institute of Justice is part of the Office of Justice Programs at the 
Department of Justice. 
 227 James M. Doyle, NIJ’s Sentinel Events Initiative: Looking Back to Look Forward, 
273 NIJ J. 1, 1–2 (2013). 
 228 Id. at 1. 
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analyzed and addressed—important keys to strengthening the [criminal justice 
system] and preventing future adverse events or outcomes.”229 The purpose of 
the NIJ Sentinel Events Initiative is to “develop a template for how state and 
local stakeholders could learn from criminal justice errors” and to “provide a 
platform where stakeholders can disseminate information, accessing each 
other’s experiences and allowing access by other jurisdictions, including 
researchers, to knowledge gained from a sentinel review.”230 
In 2013, after two years of preliminary research by NIJ fellow James 
Doyle,231 the NIJ convened a roundtable of criminal justice experts to consider 
the applicability of sentinel event review for such negative outcomes as 
wrongful convictions, erroneous release of dangerous inmates, and cold cases 
that remain unsolved for too long.232 Doyle urged his colleagues to consider 
making multidisciplinary, nonblaming review of errors a regular part of criminal 
justice practice; to make the errors themselves the mechanism for learning and 
change.233 The 2013 roundtable participants concurred with Doyle’s assessment 
and urged the NIJ to begin the process of testing the viability of sentinel event 
review in the criminal justice context.234  
In 2014, NIJ invited jurisdictions around the country to volunteer to review 
a sentinel event that had occurred in their area of authority.235 Through a 
competitive process, three sites were selected: Milwaukee, Philadelphia, and 
Baltimore.236 Teams in each of these sites designated and conducted a review of 
a “justice error”—a sentinel event—that had occurred in their jurisdiction.237 
All three sites successfully completed their reviews, providing the first empirical 
evidence of the feasibility of adopting SER in the criminal justice context.238 
While retaining promised anonymity about the details of the sentinel event each 
 
 229 Id. 
 230 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 172, at 4−5. The publication Mending Justice: 
Sentinel Event Reviews is a special report that describes Doyle’s two-year investigation of 
the feasibility of sentinel event review in the criminal justice context. NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, MENDING JUSTICE: SENTINEL EVENT REVIEWS 1 (2014).  
 231 James M. Doyle was a former defense attorney from Boston. 
 232 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 172, at 1, 5, 24. Doyle reflected that the recent 
wave of DNA exonerations had focused attention on system-wide errors in criminal justice 
and undermined public confidence in the American public justice system. Id. at 2. He noted 
that some progress had been made in addressing these issues, but that efforts to that point 
had created best practices for individual actors, while ignoring the complex interactions and 
system features that together lead to adverse events. See id. at 2−3. He deemed this “linear” 
approach inadequate to address errors in complex systems, including the criminal justice 
system. Id. at 2.  
 233 See id. at 3. 
 234 Doyle, supra note 227, at 1.  
 235 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PAVING THE WAY: LESSONS LEARNED IN SENTINEL EVENT 
REVIEWS 2 (Nov. 2015). 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. at 3.  
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site chose to review, the NIJ published a detailed report of “lessons learned” 
across the three SERs.239 
More recently, police scholars John Hollway, Calvin Lee, and Sean Smoot 
have urged the application of root cause analysis, as it has been applied in 
aviation, medicine, and other industries, to police shootings.240 They argue, as I 
do here, that our existing systems for evaluation of past officer-involved 
shootings by administrative investigations, civilian oversight, and civil and 
criminal investigation are inadequate for learning how to prevent similar 
shootings in the future.241 They agree that unlike these existing strategies, which 
are backward-looking and individual-focused, root cause analysis could 
uncover nonhuman, systemic causes and corresponding systemic remedies that 
would be more effective in preventing officer-involved shootings.242  
What is missing to this point is a more robust description of what root cause 
analysis might look like in the context of police-involved shootings, and 
precisely what kinds of systemic causes—and systemic solutions—root cause 
analysis might uncover.243 In what follows, I begin to fill that gap. 
 
 239 Id. at 2. The report covered the following topics: Where does a jurisdiction start when 
thinking about performing a sentinel event review? Id. at 3. What kind of event should be 
reviewed, including some of the benefits and challenges of selecting an older event? Id. at 
3–4. Who should be on the sentinel event team—and who should lead or facilitate the review 
process? Id. at 5–6. How can the important “non-blaming” component of sentinel event 
review be achieved? Id. at 11. In 2014 and 2015, the NIJ made four research grants as part 
of its effort to bring sentinel event reviews into the criminal justice system. Nancy Ritter, 
Testing a Concept and Beyond: Can the Criminal Justice System Adopt a Nonblaming 
Practice?, 276 NIJ J. 38, 39−40 (2015). Grants were awarded to Texas State University to 
study wrongful convictions; the Vera Institute to implement and evaluate a protocol for 
reviewing cases of self-harm in New York City jail; Michigan State University to study the 
use of sentinel event review in aviation and medicine; and the Quattrone Center for the Fair 
Administration of Justice at the University of Pennsylvania to work with the Philadelphia 
Police Department, District Attorney’s Office, Defender Association, and Court of Common 
Pleas to evaluate the effectiveness of multidisciplinary sentinel event teams. Id. This project 
will create a database of errors and near misses similar to the Aviation Safety and Reporting 
System to provide a mechanism for prioritizing negative outcomes that are suitable for 
sentinel event review. Id. The goal is to develop rules and standards for the creation and 
maintaining of multi-stakeholder teams that will embrace a culture of learning from error. 
Id. 
 240 See Hollway et al., supra note 28, at 891–98. 
 241 See id. at 891–92. 
 242 See id. at 898–99. 
 243 A notable exception is Schwartz, who suggests some possible systemic solutions. See 
Joanna C. Schwartz, System Failures in Policing, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 535, 561−62 
(2018). Her discussion, however, is quite general and does not combine individual incident 
root cause analysis with the kind of pattern analysis that has been so successful in aviation 
and medicine. 
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IV. SYSTEMS-ORIENTED REVIEW OF POLICE SHOOTINGS 
Current methods of investigating police-involved shootings differ from the 
forward-looking, systems-oriented investigations of accidents that occur in 
aviation and medicine in three critical ways. First, unlike investigations by the 
NTSB and the Joint Commission, almost none of the traditional police 
investigatory mechanisms are fully independent from the employing police 
organization.244 Second, police reviews are designed solely to determine 
whether the proximal, human actor—the officer who pulled the trigger—was 
legally culpable, i.e., whether he acted reasonably at the moment of the shot. 
Once it is determined that the officer’s conduct was legally justified, the 
investigation is over. There is no interrogation of the broader circumstances 
surrounding the shooting, no search for systems vulnerabilities, and no analysis 
of how the shooting could have been prevented. (I examine this difference in 
more detail below.) Third, existing structures for police review have no 
mechanism for sharing analyses of individual police shootings to discover 
recurring errors or recurring systems breakdowns that could help identify 
forward-looking solutions.245 
In the following pages, I illustrate what systems-oriented review might look 
like in the policing context by examining as a case study the 2014 shooting by 
a police officer of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice.246 First, though, I address the 
question of what the goal of systems-oriented review is—because that is more 
complicated in the police context than in aviation and medicine since lethal 
force is sometimes necessary to protect police and public safety. 
A. What Is the Goal of Systems-Oriented Review of Police Shootings? 
Effective systems-oriented review requires clearly defined goals. In aviation 
and medicine, the task of setting goals is relatively easy. In aviation the aim is 
to prevent airline crashes. In medicine the objective is to prevent harm or injury 
to patients that is not related to the natural course of the patient’s illness. While 
finding the right level of safety in these contexts includes financial 
 
 244 See id. at 558. 
 245 See Chuck Wexler, Why We Need to Challenge Conventional Thinking on Police Use 
of Force, in POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 
6 (2016). 
 246 I will contrast the extant accountability reviews with what I call a “modified” 
systems-oriented review. I use the term “modified” because I am not a trained expert in RCA 
and my analysis is limited to the information contained in the existing record. Full-blown 
sentinel event review leading to systems-oriented review would require additional data 
gathering, participation by individuals involved in the event being reviewed, and third-party 
experts from the context in which the events occurred.  
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considerations, there is little else to “balance” against airline safety and patient 
safety.247  
Setting a goal for systems-oriented review of police shootings is more 
complicated because there are important values (aside from cost) on the other 
side of the balance. Decreasing police-involved shootings of citizens might 
increase the risk that police officers or third parties could be shot or injured. 
Putting more pressure on police not to use their firearms might increase the 
incidence of crime or threaten public safety. In addition, the balancing is even 
more fraught because the costs and benefits on the two sides of the balance are 
not evenly distributed across demographic and socially defined communities: 
for example, police-involved shootings fall disproportionately on inner city, 
African-American communities, while many of the benefits of aggressive police 
intervention may inure to richer, whiter communities.248  
That the goal is more complicated, however, does not preclude systems-
oriented review of police shootings. It simply means that prevention measures 
must take account of conflicting values and distributional effects. The question 
for a systems-oriented investigator is whether a particular shooting (or pattern 
of shootings) could have been prevented without compromising police and 
public safety across all communities.249  
Reviews that apply current legal standards never ask this question. Legality 
of lethal force depends upon whether the officer reasonably believed the force 
he or she applied was necessary under the specific circumstances at the moment 
the shot was fired. This inquiry is ultimately about accountability, not 
prevention: it tells us whether the officer was culpable for pulling the trigger 
given what he reasonably perceived at the time. That a particular killing was 
“justified” in this legal sense, however, tells us nothing about “what kinds of 
attacks really require lethal counterforce or how often police use of deadly 
force—whether fatal or not—saves the lives of police or crime victims.”250  
Moreover, to call police-involved shootings “justifiable killings”251 is to 
implicitly deny the social costs to victims, families, and the broader community 
 
 247 I say “little else” because it is possible that some efforts to create fewer accidents or 
incidents in aviation and medicine could have other, less easily monetized costs. For 
example, institution of a checklist before a surgery could increase the length of that 
procedure, which could lead to fewer surgeries and longer wait times for patients to get 
necessary treatments. Some human costs like these are not wholly monetizable. But, in 
general, the primary value on the other side of the equation is financial cost. 
 248 See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(2011) (discussing the distributional effects of criminal justice actions). 
 249 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL 91 (2017).  
 250 Id. at 124 (emphasis added).  
 251 The FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) designates officer-involved, 
fatal shootings as “justifiable killings by police officers of felons.” Id. at 122. The SHR is 
part of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program administered by the FBI. BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATION’S TWO MEASURES OF HOMICIDE 1 (2014), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ntmh.pdf [https://perma.cc/9264-R5UF]. “The 
UCR provides aggregate annual counts of the number of homicides occurring in the United 
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of legally justified shootings, especially those that were factually unnecessary 
because neither the officer nor the public was ultimately at risk.252 While some 
officer-involved shootings might be unavoidable, every police shooting that 
takes a human life is regrettable and tragic.253 This point gets obscured by an 
investigative regime that ends by calling a shooting “justified.” Whether or not 
justified, every officer-involved shooting is undesirable and worthy of review 
to understand how and why it occurred and how it can be prevented in the future.  
That the legal standard governing review of police shootings is focused on 
placing (or eliminating) blame rather than on decreasing unnecessary shootings 
underlines the need for additional, systems-oriented investigations. In the next 
section I illustrate the difference between accountability review and systems-
oriented review by contrasting the extant reviews of the Tamir Rice shooting 
with a more systems-oriented inquiry. 
B. Why Accountability Review Does Not Prevent Police Shootings: A 
Case Study of the Tamir Rice Shooting 
On November 22, 2014, Tamir Rice was shot in a city park by Officer 
Timothy Loehmann from the Cleveland (Ohio) Division of Police.254 Loehmann 
and his partner, Officer Garmback, entered the park in their vehicle in response 
to a police dispatch call reporting a black male who allegedly kept “pulling a 
gun out of his pants and pointing it at people.”255 The officers drove across the 
 
States.” Id. The SHR provides additional details about each homicide incident, including 
jurisdiction, exact date, demographic data on victim and perpetrator, circumstances 
surrounding the homicide, and the relationship between the victim and perpetrator. Id. This 
information permits detailed examination of different kinds of homicides. Id. SHR data are 
provided voluntarily by law enforcement agencies, and reporting is generally inconsistent 
and incomplete. Id. at 2.  
 252 The social cost to victims and their communities is obvious. What might be less 
obvious is that there are also grave personal and professional costs for an officer who is 
involved in a lethal police-involved shooting. See generally DAVID KLINGER, INTO THE KILL 
ZONE 7, 203–71 (2004) (describing the dramatic, negative effects that police-involved 
shootings can have on the officer who pulled the trigger, effects that have been called “post-
shooting trauma”—a form of traumatic stress syndrome—in law enforcement circles). 
 253 See Hollway et al., supra note 28, at 887–88 (“[O]ur system of criminal justice 
defines any [officer-involved shooting]—even one in which all protocols were followed by 
the officer—as an undesirable outcome, and one worthy of review to understand how and 
why it occurred with the goal being its prevention in the future.”). 
 254 KIMBERLY A. CRAWFORD, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, REVIEW OF DEADLY 
FORCE INCIDENT: TAMIR RICE 1, http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/  
en-US/Tamir%20Rice%20Investigation/Crawford-Review%20of%20Deadly%20 
Force-Tamir%20Rice.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z74Q-5JTS].  
 255 TIMOTHY J. MCGINTY, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S REPORT ON THE NOVEMBER 22, 2014 SHOOTING DEATH OF TAMIR 
RICE 3–4, http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/en-US/Rice%20Case 
%20Report%20FINAL%20FINAL%2012-28a.pdf [https://perma.cc/QM96-3NRA] 
[hereinafter CCPO REPORT]. 
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ground close to the suspect and braked on the snow-covered grass.256 The 
vehicle then slid over forty feet to a point adjacent to where Tamir was 
standing.257 Officer Loehmann disembarked and fired his weapon within two 
seconds after the vehicle came to a stop.258 Tamir Rice was transported to a 
nearby hospital, but died several hours later from his injuries.259 
It turned out that Tamir was only 12 and that the gun was an “airsoft” gun,260 
which shoots small plastic pellets and is not designed to kill or wound.261 Officer 
Loehmann later reported that Tamir looked like he was reaching for a gun in his 
waistband.262 
In the aftermath of the shooting, the Cleveland Division of Police and the 
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office launched investigations into the 
shooting.263 Tamir Rice’s family and community called for criminal 
prosecutions of the officers and filed a wrongful death suit against the officers, 
the police department and the City of Cleveland, alleging claims under the 
Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and state tort law.264 The lawsuit 
and demands for prosecution reflect the strong causal intuitions and moral 
commitments that underlie calls for accountability review: the officers drove 
their police car into the park and shot and killed a young boy holding a pellet 
gun. Surely someone must be held accountable for Tamir’s tragic death.  
 
 256 Id. at 4. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id.  
 259 Id. at 5. 
 260 Id. at 1. Airsoft guns are made to look realistic, but they have orange safety caps to 
distinguish them from the real thing. Mary Kilpatrick, Tamir Rice Shooting: What Is an 
Airsoft Gun?, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index 
.ssf/2014/11/tamir_rice_shooting_what_is_an.html [https://perma.cc/NLS6-T4VV]. 
The safety cap on the gun Tamir was holding had been removed before he borrowed the gun 
from a friend. Memorandum from S. Lamar Sims, Esquire, to James A. Gutierrez and 
Matthew E. Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, Cuyahoga Cty. Office of the Prosecutor 
2 (Oct. 6, 2015), https://cdn3.vox-cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/4149926/ 
Colorado_prosecutor_Tamir_Rice.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ESA6-UZLK]. Airsoft guns 
are purchased by young people—there are no restrictions on sale to minors—and also by 
war-reenactors, by law enforcement officials conducting drills, and by former military 
personnel. Kilpatrick, supra note 260.  
 261 Kilpatrick, supra note 260. 
 262 Statement of Officer Timothy Loehmann, CUYAHOGA CTY. OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR (Nov. 30, 2015), http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor  
/en-US/Tamir%20Rice%20Investigation/Officer%20Loehmann%20Statement.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/CMP9-VJTL]. 
 263 Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges in 
Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html [https://perma.cc/UNH7-
N76L]; CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 1. 
 264 See generally First Amended Complaint, Winston v. Loehmann, No. 1:14-CV-02670 
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2015) (detailing the various claims brought by the administrator of the 
estate of Tamir Rice). 
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There were three layers of accountability review of the shooting. The first 
was an administrative review by the Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) of the 
Cleveland Police Department to determine whether police employees—the two 
officers and the police dispatcher—had violated any police rules or policies.265 
The second, an administrative inquiry by the Critical Incident Review 
Committee (CIRC), was tasked to investigate the officers’ actions and make 
recommendations to police management for changes to training, rules, policies, 
or equipment in light of the reviewed incident.266 The third review was 
conducted by the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office (CCPO) to determine 
whether there was a basis to bring criminal charges against the two officers 
involved in the shooting.267  
All three investigations concluded that Officer Loehmann had acted 
lawfully because he reasonably believed, based on the facts and circumstances 
known to him at the time, that Tamir Rice was reaching into his waistband to 
pull out a real gun.268 The only sanctions that were brought against either officer 
were administrative sanctions: Officer Garmback was suspended for ten work 
days and ordered to attend remedial tactical training for failing to stop his police 
vehicle more quickly and declining to coordinate his approach with other police 
vehicles.269 Officer Loehmann was fired for failing to disclose a negative 
employment history on his application, but not for shooting Tamir Rice.270 The 
 
 265 See INTERNAL AFFAIRS UNIT, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT FROM TIMOTHY A. STACHO, 
SERGEANT, CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE, TO MONROE B. GOINS, LIEUTENANT, 
CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE 3 (Feb. 2015), https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ 
z5g1kd9qzjggdw4/AABPS1s8y5g_pptRyUYI0g1oa?dl=0&preview=IA+Report.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/YA56-8Z28] [hereinafter IAU REPORT]. 
 266 CRITICAL INCIDENT REVIEW COMM., TAMIR RICE INCIDENT 1 (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/z5g1kd9qzjggdw4/AABPS1s8y5g_pptRyUYI0g1oa?dl
=0&preview=CIRC+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT5B-DUMK] [hereinafter CIRC 
REPORT]. The CIRC was empaneled by Police Chief Calvin Williams in February 2016. Id. 
The Committee was chaired by the Deputy Chief of Field Operations, Cleveland Police 
Department, and consisted of eight members, five from the Cleveland Police Department 
and three administrators of the City of Cleveland. Id. It met from February 22, 2016 through 
October 6, 2016 and issued a report and an addendum. Id. at 3.  
 267 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 1. 
 268 See id. at 70; CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 17; IAU REPORT, supra note 265, at 
9. 
 269 See Letter from Michael McGrath, Dir., Cleveland Dep’t of Pub. Safety, to Patrol 
Officer Frank Garmback III, Cleveland Div. of Police 2–4 (May 30, 2017) [hereinafter 
McGrath Letter]. The CIRC investigation made a general recommendation that police 
receive more training in “off roadway driving [as well as] unconventional places.” CIRC 
REPORT, supra note 266, at 21. 
 270 Lindsey Bever & Wesley Lowery, Cleveland Police Officer Who Fatally Shot 12-
Year-Old Tamir Rice Is Fired—But Not for the Killing, WASH. POST (May 30, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/05/30/cleveland-police-
officer-who-fatally-shot-12-year-old-tamir-rice-is-fired/ [on file with the author]. 
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city ultimately settled the wrongful death lawsuit with the plaintiffs for $6 
million.271 
1. The Inadequacy of Accountability Review 
The legal question being interrogated by the three investigations was 
whether the shooting of Tamir Rice was a justified use of deadly force.272 Each 
of the three applied the Fourth Amendment standard to conclude that Officer 
Loehmann had acted lawfully.273 Under Graham v. Connor,274 police use of 
force is lawful if the officer’s actions were “objectively reasonable” in light of 
the facts and circumstances as the officer knew or reasonably perceived them to 
be when he took the shot.275 The reasonableness analysis requires “careful 
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the 
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat 
to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest 
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”276 The Graham Court cautioned that 
legality of force must not be judged with the “20/20 vision of hindsight,” but 
must take into account that police officers are required to make “split-second 
judgments” under “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances.277 
 
 271 Mitch Smith, Tamir Rice’s Family to Receive $6 Million from Cleveland, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/26/us/tamir-rice-family-cleveland-
settlement.html [https://perma.cc/39JB-5TKC]. 
 272 See CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 1; CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 1; IAU 
REPORT, supra note 265, at 3.  
 273 See CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 35; CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 17; IAU 
REPORT, supra note 265, at 5.  
 274 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). 
 275 Although there is a circuit split on this question, compare Young v. City of 
Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (providing that the conduct of officials leading up 
to the use of force should be considered), with Livermore v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 407 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (providing that everything leading up to the use of force should be disregarded), 
the Supreme Court has signaled that the timeframe for determining the propriety of allegedly 
excessive force is extremely narrow. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 
With very limited exceptions, the broader context that led up to the need for force is not 
relevant to the Graham inquiry. 
 276 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 277 Id. at 396–97. Although the Supreme Court has opined in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 
372, 383 (2007), that the Graham standard applies to both deadly and non-deadly force, 
many jurisdictions, including Cleveland, continue to apply the more specialized rules of 
Tennessee v. Garner to deadly force cases. See CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 35. As the 
CCPO framed it: “Law enforcement officers can only use deadly force in making an arrest 
where the police have probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of death or 
serious bodily harm to the police or to public,” for example, “if the suspect threatens the 
officer with a weapon.” Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985)). 
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Applying the Graham standard to the shooting of Tamir Rice, all three 
reports concluded that Office Loehmann acted reasonably when he pulled the 
trigger.278 For example, according to the IAU investigator:  
As [the officers] arrived on scene, Officer Loehmann saw a male, who fit the 
given description, stand up from a picnic table and place a gun in his 
pants . . . . The male walked toward the path of the [patrol] car and, as the 
[patrol] car came to a stop in front of him, raised his shirt with one hand and 
began drawing the gun from his pants with the other. Officer Loehmann exited 
the vehicle and, fearing for his and Officer Garmback’s lives, shot the male 
two times in the abdomen and immediately sought cover behind the [patrol] 
car.279 
The investigator concluded that “the use of deadly force by Officer 
Loehmann was reasonable and within the guidelines set forth in GPO 2.1.01 
[Use of Force],” which mirrors the Graham standard.280  
The CIRC investigator281 and the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office 
also agreed that Officer Loehmann had acted lawfully under Graham.282 The 
CCPO report began with the troubling and revealing concession that Officer 
Garmback’s “approach—skidding to a halt directly in front of where Tamir was 
standing—had left [Officer Loehmann] dangerously exposed to what 
[Loehmann] believed was a suspect drawing a gun.”283 But this observation was 
irrelevant to its analysis of the legality of the shooting: 
[T]he two responding officers [were led] to believe a real man with a real gun 
was threatening innocent people’s lives at a recreation center . . . . The officers, 
who had no idea that the gun was fake or that Tamir was only [twelve], thought 
he was going to pull the gun out at them.284 
 
 
 278 See CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 70; CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 17; IAU 
REPORT, supra note 265, at 9.  
 279 IAU REPORT, supra note 265, at 8–9. 
 280 See id. at 9 (quoting CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE, GENERAL POLICE ORDERS ch. 
2, § 2.1.01 (2014)). 
 281 For example, the CIRC Report reported: 
The CIRC examined the tactics used by PPO Loehmann and P.O. Garmback and 
determined they were reasonable and were based on their response to [Tamir’s] actions 
of standing up and retrieving the gun from the picnic table, placing then [sic] gun in his 
waistband then initially turning away from officers, and then finally turning back 
towards the officers and taking the gun out of his waistband.”  
CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 17. The CIRC concluded that according to its “review of 
Officer Loehmann’s actions [involving the shooting of Tamir Rice] there are no apparent 
rule or policy violations.” Id. at 20. 
 282 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 66, 70. 
 283 Id. at 66 (emphasis added). 
 284 Id. at 69. 
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[T]he evidence does not show that [Loehmann’s] decision to shoot was 
unreasonable, or that it was feasible to give more commands than he 
did . . . Loehmann was facing a suspect pulling an object from his 
waist . . . . The law does not require an officer to wait until being fired upon to 
confirm whether the gun is real or to give the suspect additional time to open 
fire to draw and fire [sic] upon the officer.285  
The legal analysis applied in each of these reviews demonstrates four crucial 
limitations that make accountability review of the shooting inadequate for the 
purpose of preventing the next shooting. First, the reviews focused almost 
entirely on the actions of Officer Loehmann, the proximal human causer who 
pulled the trigger. Investigation of other officials was for the limited purpose of 
ascertaining whether they had violated police rules, not to interrogate whether 
their errors were causally linked to the mistaken shooting.286 In addition, none 
of the investigations considered whether broader systems failures contributed to 
the errors, misjudgments, or misunderstandings made by police officials. 
Second, the applicable legal standard limited the analysis to the narrow 
question of whether Officer Loehmann reasonably believed that his life was in 
imminent danger at the moment he discharged his weapon.287 As a result of this 
narrow timeframe, the lawfulness inquiry did not consider whether the officers’ 
approach—coming within four to seven feet of an allegedly armed suspect—
unreasonably increased the risk that lethal force would be required. For 
example, it did not invite investigators to consider whether the officer failed to 
use de-escalation techniques or provoked the confrontation in some way. 
Nothing that occurred before the shooting mattered to the investigation.  
Third, the ultimate question to be answered was whether Officer Loehmann 
was culpable for what he did. The purpose of the exercise was to assign blame, 
i.e., to determine whether the officer should be punished, reprimanded, or fined 
for what happened. Once each of the reviews had determined that the shooting 
by Officer Loehmann was lawful, the investigation was over and no additional 
causal inquiry was required or indeed permitted. 
Fourth, the investigations were almost entirely backward-looking. The goal 
was to determine what policies, rules, or laws were broken and to hand down 
sanctions for past behavior.288 By contrast, prevention requires investigators to 
ask not “what happened and who is to blame?” but, rather, “why did this happen 
 
 285 Id. at 66. 
 286 See, e.g., CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 20. 
 287 The Supreme Court has signaled that the timeframe for determining the propriety of 
allegedly excessive force is relatively limited. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 
(1989). Courts of appeals are divided on the question of how narrowly the timeframe should 
be defined, with some courts permitting a more liberal analysis. See supra note 275 and 
accompanying citations.  
 288 Only the CIRC analysis had anything to say about forward-looking policies, and its 
recommendations were vanishingly thin (one page out of twenty-one) and embarrassingly 
superficial. See CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 21.  
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and how can we make sure it doesn’t happen again?”289 At the end of the day, 
“accountability review” of the sort described above is not well adapted to asking 
the “why” question.  
Accountability questions are very important, and administrative reviews 
and lawsuits that ask them play an important role. These legal actions uncover 
important information, vindicate important society goals, and—at least 
sometimes—identify and punish culpable actors.290 But to focus exclusively on 
individual blame by the last actor for actions in the past is to miss something 
vital. This kind of analysis will almost never prevent the shooting of another 
Tamir Rice tomorrow, or next week, or next year: once the shooting is 
“justified” the investigator’s job is done. In the complex, tightly coupled world 
of policing, with its susceptibility to systems accidents, we need a systems-
oriented approach that goes beyond the search for accountability.  
2. Applying Systems-Oriented Review 
My goal in this part is to apply a more systems-oriented, forward-looking 
analysis to the events that led to the shooting of Tamir Rice. I do not purport to 
be doing actual “sentinel event review (SER)” as it is practiced in aviation and 
medicine. Formal SER would require additional data gathering, participation by 
individuals involved in the event being reviewed, and third-party experts, such 
as police and forensic specialists. By contrast, I am limited to the information 
that was gathered in the accountability investigations, and I can only gesture at 
possible systemic causes and preventative solutions. To the extent possible, 
however, I use the materials, analysis, and conclusions contained in the 
investigative record of the Tamir Rice shooting to highlight some of the 
additional questions that systemic, sentinel event review would be trying to ask 
(and answer).291 
Recall that SER is designed to investigate a harmful outcome—here a police 
shooting—that may signal underlying weaknesses in a system or process.292 If 
properly analyzed and addressed, a sentinel event can provide important insights 
for preventing future, similar adverse outcomes.293 SER generally employs root 
 
 289 See Hollway et al., supra note 28, at 904 (describing the difference between 
“accountability review” and “root cause analysis”). 
 290 Id. at 890. 
 291 This Part relies on the reviews by IAU, CIRC, and CCPO and their supporting 
documents, including witness statements, reports by independent police expert, an Ohio 
Highway Patrol Accident Reconstruction Report, and an enhanced video of the moments 
before, during and after the shooting. The enhanced video was solicited by the Cuyahoga 
Prosecutor’s Office from Grant Fredericks, an accredited video analyst with Forensic Video 
Solutions in Spokane Washington. See GRANT FREDERICKS, FORENSIC VIDEO SOLUTIONS, 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2623185/2015-11-28-tr-video-ehance 
ment-forensic-video.pdf [https://perma.cc/M22J-RYLV].  
 292 See supra Part III.  
 293 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 172, at 1. 
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cause analysis as a problem-solving tool to determine not only what and how 
the harm-causing event occurred, but also why it happened.294 
One effective method to begin the process of identifying root causes is the 
“Five Whys” analysis. It involves identifying a problem and then asking a series 
of “whys” to try to get to successive underlying causes.295 The idea is that it 
takes at least five “Why?” questions—but sometimes more—to uncover a 
“root” or systems-oriented cause.296 
To take a very simple example, suppose the problem is that your car won’t 
start. Here is how the “Five Whys” analysis might play out:  
PROBLEM: The vehicle won’t start. 
Why? Because the battery is dead. 
Why? Because the alternator is not working. 
Why? Because the alternator belt is broken. 
Why? Because the alternator belt was worn past its useful lifespan and not 
replaced. 
Why? Because the vehicle was not regularly maintained. 
SOLUTION: Schedule regular maintenance checks.297 
The immediate cause of the problem was a dead battery. If the owner gets a 
new battery, it will fix that problem and the car will run. Of course, the battery 
will quickly run down if she doesn’t also get the alternator working. But, even 
if she gets both a new battery and a new alternator belt, the problem will 
eventually reoccur unless the car has routine maintenance checks. The only way 
to keep the same series of events from happening again is to attend to the root 
problem, the cause, that lies at the beginning of a whole chain of causes. 
Sentinel event review of individual harm-causing events is a first step 
toward identifying systems-oriented solutions.298 It may be that nonhuman 
causes such as organizational factors (management, policies, organizational 
pressures, or occupational culture) and/or workplace factors (supervision, 
training, or working conditions) have created a flammable brew just waiting to 
be ignited by human error.299 Solutions, then, should aim not to change people 
directly, but to change the conditions that lead them to make mistakes by 
adopting barriers and safeguards that constrain human conduct.300 
Sentinel event review of the Tamir Rice shooting begins by identifying the 
harmful event or problem to be investigated: the shooting of an unarmed twelve-
year-old boy. 
 
 294 See Hollway et al., supra note 28, at 906. 
 295 Id. at 904. 
 296 Id. at 905. 
 297 This example appears in id. at 904. 
 298 Id. at 905. Tools like the “Five Whys” analysis press investigators to work backward 
in the causal chain behind the human causers identified by accountability review. 
 299 REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 33, at 173. Systemic factors can act as “error 
traps” that predispose to repeated, similar mistakes. 
 300 Hollway et al., supra note 28, at 905.  
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PROBLEM: Police Officer Loehmann exited his patrol car in a city park and 
shot an unarmed boy. 
The first “why” question asks why the officer would have fired his gun at 
an unarmed person. It is the only question that was addressed by each of the 
three investigations of the Tamir Rice shooting.301 The answer they gave went 
something like this: 
Why? Because when Officer Loehmann fired the shot he was standing four to 
seven feet from an individual who fit a police dispatcher’s description of a male 
in the park who had been “pointing a gun at people.” The officer fired because 
he thought the male was reaching toward his waistband to pull out a gun. 
This answer essentially ended the legal inquiry because it supported a 
finding that the officer acted reasonably, even if mistakenly: Officer Loehmann 
reasonably believed that the male he faced when he alighted from the vehicle 
was the same person who had been threatening people with a gun and he 
reasonably believed the person was reaching into his waistband for that gun.302 
Based on these facts, all three reviews concluded that the shooting was 
lawful.303 The investigations ended there.  
Given the narrowness of this analysis, the question of prevention never 
came up. Indeed, the lawfulness judgment comes with an implicit assumption 
that the shooting need not—or could not—have been prevented: if the shooting 
was reasonably necessary to protect the officers’ safety, then it was—by 
definition—unavoidable. But this assumption is unfounded. That a shooting is 
justified addresses the momentary culpability of the officer at the moment he 
pulled the trigger. It tells us nothing about whether this is the kind of 
circumstance that requires lethal counterforce in order to save the lives of police 
or third parties or to prevent crime. Specifically, the legality of the shooting does 
not tell us whether this shooting—and others like it—could be prevented without 
compromising police or public safety. For that we need an investigation that 
employs a broader timeframe and goes beyond the first why question to 
interrogate deeper, systems-oriented causes. 
James Reason’s typology of errors for assessing organizational accidents is 
helpful for expanding the causal horizon beyond the first “why” question 
addressed by accountability review.304 Reason makes a distinction between 
 
 301 See CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 1; CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 17; IAU 
Report, supra note 265, at 3. 
 302 See CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 69. 
 303 See supra note 278 and accompanying text.  
 304 Reason’s work is widely cited by virtually all institutions that routinely conduct root 
cause analysis. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 230, at 6 (citing REASON, supra 
note 33). His most cited books were published in the 1990s, but his work goes back to the 
early 1970s. See JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR (1990); JAMES REASON, MANAGING THE 
RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS (1997). 
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“active failures” and “latent conditions,” both of which contribute to 
organizational accidents.305  
Active failures are unsafe acts on the part of those who are in direct contact 
with the system, including, but not limited to, the proximal causer.306 They can 
result from: inattention or forgetfulness (“skill-based slips or lapses”); failing to 
apply good rules and policies or applying bad rules and policies (“rule-based 
mistakes”); or misapplication of rules or policies to new or novel situations 
(“knowledge-based mistakes”).307 Active failures can also involve violations (as 
opposed to merely errors). Violations arise from motivational factors and may 
result from intentionally cutting corners, thrill seeking, habitual rule breaking, 
or willful violations not condoned by management.308 
Reason’s discussion of latent, harm-causing conditions is especially 
enlightening in the policing context, given accountability review’s failure to 
look beyond immediate, human causes. Unlike active failures and violations, 
latent conditions may (but need not) involve mistakes by human actors.309 
Rather, they are preexisting, causal factors (culpable or not) that are necessary 
to the harmful event, like oxygen is a necessary condition for fire.310 
Organizational accidents in complex systems “arise from the insidious 
accumulation of delayed-action failures lying mainly in the managerial and 
organizational spheres.”311 “Such latent conditions (or latent failures) are like 
resident pathogens within the system.”312 “Organizational accidents can result 
when these latent conditions combine with active failures (errors or violations 
at the ‘sharp end’) . . . to breach or bypass the system defenses.”313 
In Reason’s parlance, an organizational accident involves much more than 
the conduct, culpable or not, of the proximate causer.314 The “accident 
sequence” begins with the organization, where management decisions, 
organizational processes, and corporate culture create conditions in the 
workplace that promote errors and violations.315 These conditions then combine 
with human propensities for errors and violations which can result in risk-
creating acts.316 In order for an accident to occur, the organizational and 
 
 305 REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 33, at 173. 
 306 Id. 
 307 JAMES REASON, ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS REVISITED 14–16 (2016) [hereinafter 
REASON, ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS REVISITED].  
 308 Id. at 14. 
 309 Id. at 2–3. 
 310 Id. at 3. 
 311 Id. at 9. 
 312 Id. 
 313 REASON, ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS REVISITED, supra note 307, at 9. 
 314 Id. at 10. 
 315 Id. Workplace conditions might include high workloads, time pressure, lack of skill 
and experience, and inadequate equipment. Id. 
 316 Id. 
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workplace conditions must combine with human errors or violations and 
penetrate the system’s ordinary defenses.317 
Reason’s typology of accident review highlights the grave limitations of the 
accountability analysis applied in the Tamir Rice investigations. Stopping with 
the conclusion that Officer Loehmann acted reasonably at the moment of the 
shooting leaves multiple potential causes unexplored. By contrast, a systems 
analysis requires investigators to reach back in time before the moment of the 
shooting by asking a descending series of questions. Applying a “Five Whys (or 
more)” framework, one line of analysis could look like this:318 
PROBLEM: Police Officer Loehmann exited his patrol car and shot an 
unarmed boy in a city park.  
Why? (1) Because when Officer Loehmann fired the shot he was standing four 
to seven feet from an individual who fit a police dispatcher’s description of a 
male in the park who had been “pointing a gun at people.”319 The officer fired 
because he thought the male was reaching toward his waistband to pull out a 
gun.320 
Why? (2) Because Officer Garmback drove the police vehicle right up to the 
suspect instead of stopping farther back and seeking cover.321 
Why? (3) Because Office Garmback wanted to stop the vehicle close enough 
so the officers could pursue the suspect on foot.322 The grass was wet and 
snowy, causing the vehicle to slide even closer than he intended.323 
Why? (4) Because the officers (mistakenly) thought there was an “active 
shooter” in the park, which may have influenced their decision to come in 
quickly and not wait for backup.324 
Why? (5) Because the officers were responding to a dispatcher’s inaccurate 
report that there was an adult male in the park who was threatening people with 
a gun.325 
Why? (6) Because the dispatcher failed to tell police that the 911-caller had 
actually said that the gun was “probably fake” and that the alleged shooter was 
“probably a juvenile.”326 
 
 317 In the language of Reason’s famous “Swiss Cheese” model of accident causation, the 
accident only occurs if the holes in the cheese are lined up so that the hazard finds its way 
through all the potential layers—organizational, workplace and individual—that would 
otherwise arrest its progress. Id. at 2. 
 318 Recall again that the idea behind “Five Whys” is that it takes at least five why 
questions to get to a root cause. As will become clear, this line of analysis is only one series 
of questions that would be posed as part of a multi-linear, systems review. 
 319 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 3. 
 320 Id. at 6. 
 321 Id. at 49. 
 322 Id. at 7. 
 323 Id. at 49. 
 324 Id. at 47. 
 325 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 69. 
 326 Id. at 3. 
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a. The Approach 
The questions numbered (2) through (4) above, interrogate the question why 
Officer Loehmann came to be standing so close to an active shooter. Why would 
Officer Loehmann have disembarked from the passenger seat of the patrol car 
within four to seven feet of an individual who was reportedly threatening people 
with a gun? The instant investigations considered these questions, but only in 
connection with possible violations of discrete police rules or policies.327 By 
contrast, sentinel review seeks to determine why the officers used the close 
approach and whether their decision was a causal factor in the mistaken 
shooting.  
The investigators concluded that the police officers entered the park in 
response to a “Code-1,” which was the highest priority call.328 They drove their 
vehicle past a dead-end street and over wet, snowy grass, allegedly to get good 
access to the location of the alleged shooter.329 According to a forensic analysis 
by the Ohio State Highway Patrol, which was accepted by the CCPO, the police 
vehicle was traveling at about 19 mph when the officer braked to a stop.330 The 
police car came to rest only four to seven feet from where pre-teen Tamir Rice 
was then standing.331 
In defense of their close approach, the officers claimed that they purposely 
drove right up to the suspect because they had seen him pick up an object, place 
it in his waistband, and begin walking toward a nearby recreation building.332 
Officer Garmback stated that his approach was intended to keep the suspect 
from entering the recreation building where he might pose a danger to people 
 
 327 CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 20. 
 328 A Code-1 designation indicated that the incident posed a significant public risk. 
CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 41. 
 329 Id. at 7. 
 330 Officer Garmback said in his written statement that he was traveling at 10–12 mph, 
id., but the Ohio State Highway Patrol Report put the speed at 19 mph. Id. at 30. The latter 
speed was accepted by the CCPO REPORT. Id. 
 331 CRAWFORD, supra note 254, at 1. The investigations and witness statements, 
including statements by the officers themselves, assert that people on the scene before and 
after the shooting thought 12-year-old Tamir was much older, perhaps as old as 18 or 19. 
See, e.g., CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 6. That he was mistaken for an adult rather than 
a child is consistent with social science studies identifying structural racism in age 
estimations of black male children. See Phillip Atiha Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: 
Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 
532 (2014) (explaining that minority children are consistently estimated to be older than they 
actually are, while Caucasian children are not). 
 332 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 6. The officers invoked the Fifth Amendment and 
gave only written statements to the Internal Affairs Committee and to the CCPO. Id. at 5–6. 
It appears that they were interviewed by the CIRC investigator. See CIRC REPORT, supra 
note 266, at 14. 
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inside.333 On this explanation, the officers intentionally chose their close 
approach to allow them to disembark and pursue the suspect on foot.334  
It bears emphasis that not one of the police experts or investigators involved 
in the official review of these events accepted this defense of the officers’ 
approach. All agreed that no reasonable officer would have tried to engage an 
active shooter from such close range, but, rather, would have stopped their 
vehicle, taken cover and called for backup.335 For example, the Internal Affairs 
Unit concluded that Officer Garmback “did not employ proper tactics when he 
operated the [patrol] car up to what was reported to be an armed suspect, thereby 
violating [police policy].”336 The investigator concluded that Garmback had 
recklessly approached a suspect who was allegedly threatening to shoot people 
“without [waiting for] backup” even though another squad car had primary 
responsibility for the area.337 This action “placed himself and his partner in a 
position where either or both of them could have been injured by the suspect.”338 
The officer’s tactically flawed approach called for administrative sanctions 
against him.339 
Police expert Jeffrey Noble, who reviewed the video of the circumstances 
surrounding the shooting for the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office, also 
strongly disputed the officers’ defense of their close approach:  
Reasonable police officers responding to a man with a gun call would have 
stopped their vehicle prior to entering the park to visually survey the area to 
 
 333 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 7 (“As we moved in to the park, I saw the male in 
the gazebo. He matched the description given over the radio . . . . I believed at first the male 
was going to run. I think I told my partner, ‘watch him he’s going to run.’ However, he 
stopped and turned towards our cruiser . . . . Part of my intentions was [sic] to keep him away 
from entering the Recreation Center Building.”). 
 334 See CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 14–15 (“[Garmback] states he thought the 
suspect might run and slammed on the brakes in order to stop the car and ‘bail out.’ He stated 
he did this so that they could run after the subject. P.O. Garmback indicated he believed the 
subject might shoot at them because he did not run away as other subjects usually have in 
the past.”). 
 335 See, e.g., IAU REPORT, supra note 265, at 5. Commander Brian Hefferman who, in 
reviewing the IAU’s recommendations, acknowledged Garmback’s alleged rationale (that 
he was worried the suspect would flee), but concluded that Garmback should have adopted 
a “safer approach” when working as a Field Training Officer with a rookie probationary 
partner. Id. 
 336 Id. at 6. 
 337 McGrath Letter, supra note 269, at 3. The letter advises Garmback of the results of 
the administrative pre-disciplinary hearing held on March 13, 2017, in which Garmback was 
charged with a series of rule violations. Id. at 1.  
 338 IAU REPORT, supra note 265, at 6. 
 339 As his reprimand letter framed it, Garmback approached a suspect who was allegedly 
threatening to shoot people “without [waiting for] backup” even though another squad car 
had primary responsibility for the area. McGrath Letter, supra note 269, at 3. He was 
sentenced to a ten-workday suspension for employing improper tactics in approaching an 
active shooter, failing to wait for backup, and failing to coordinate his actions with the police 
team that had primary responsibility for that area. Id. at 2–4. 
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avoid driving upon a subject who may be armed. This serves not only to protect 
the officers, but also serves to protect others who may be in the area and it 
provides both time and distance for the officers to evaluate the situation and 
develop a plan. It also allows time for other officers to arrive to provide 
assistance. 
. . . . 
The officers’ grossly reckless tactics placed Officer Loehmann in a position 
where he was within a few feet of Tamir . . . . [This was] counter to virtually 
all police training that counsels officers to develop a plan prior to confronting 
a subject, to take their time and proceed cautiously and slowly in attempting to 
resolve a situation, to remain calm, to remain at a safe distance from a subject, 
to wait for backup when possible, and to employ tactics focused on de-
escalation.340 
Noble described the alternatives in some detail: 
[P]olice officers are trained how to evaluate and manage potentially violent 
field situations and how to apply tactics to minimize the danger of risk to 
themselves and others . . . . Reasonable officers understand the value of cover 
and concealment, contact and cover strategies, and calm and effective 
negotiation skills. They are well-versed in containing scenes, setting 
perimeters, isolating suspects, and evacuating those in harm’s way. Modern 
police officers are also provided a wide range of tools (including less lethal 
options like pepper spray, Tasers, and impact projectiles) to minimize the 
necessity of using serious or deadly force.341  
As an alternative defense for his close approach, Garmback claimed that he 
meant to stop further from the suspect, but the brakes locked and the vehicle slid 
closer than he had intended.342 It is undisputed that the squad car slid somewhere 
between 40 and 75 feet after the officer applied the brakes.343 This second 
 
 340 JEFFREY J. NOBLE, PRELIMINARY EXPERT REPORT OF JEFFREY J. NOBLE 8–9 (Nov. 
2015), https://www.chandralaw.com/files/blog/Jeff-Noble-Preliminary-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K2T6-ELFM] (emphasis added); see also ROGER CLARK, EXPERT 
REPORT ON THE SHOOTING DEATH OF TAMIR RICE 10, https://www.ecbalaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/00234247.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8BC-S5B5] (“Officers are 
trained to approach similar situations carefully, to assess it, and try to de-escalate it. Here, 
Officers Loehmann and Garmback did the opposite. Officer Garmback jumped the curb, 
drove through the park at a reckless speed, stopped right beside Tamir, and Officer 
Loehmann jumped out shooting . . . . [T]hey had plenty of time to stop their car sooner and 
assess the situation from a position of cover and safety.”). 
 341 NOBLE, supra note 340, at 7. 
 342 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 7 (“The cruiser did slide as I applied my brakes. I 
am not sure how far. The car did not stop where I intended.”) On the day the shooting 
occurred, the ground was wet with snow and covered with wet leaves. Id. at 4. 
 343 See id. at 30 (stating that, based on the speed of the vehicle, the frictional value of 
the surface at the time, and video evidence, Ohio State Highway Patrol Sergeant John Thorne 
determined that the vehicle slid to a stop at a minimum of 40.3 feet in 3.5 seconds, or a 
maximum of 73.3 feet in 4.5 seconds). 
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explanation for Garmback’s close approach, however, begs two important 
questions: First, was the officer driving at a safe rate of speed when he applied 
the brakes, given the need for caution in confronting a possible active shooter? 
Second, was his intended stopping point far enough back to afford safety and 
cover in a dangerous situation, given that the grass was wet and snowy? If the 
answer to either of these questions is “no,” then we are back to saying that 
Garmback violated best police practices by coming in too close to an active 
shooter.344 
Although police experts universally condemned the officer’s close approach 
as violating police best practices—and the IAU recommended discipline of 
Officer Garmback for these actions345—none considered whether the close 
approach was a causal factor in the shooting. The CCPO report stated that 
Officer Garmback’s “approach—skidding to a halt directly in front of where 
Tamir was standing—had left [Officer Loehmann] dangerously exposed to what 
he believed was a suspect drawing a gun.”346 The IAU investigation concurred 
that Garmback violated “cover and concealment training” and “high risk traffic 
stop training” when he drove his police car “up to what was reported to be an 
armed suspect” thereby “plac[ing] himself and his partner in a position where 
either or both of them could have been injured by the suspect.”347 But when 
considering the lawfulness (reasonableness) of the shooting itself, both 
investigations treated Officer Loehmann’s dangerous location as a “given” and 
 
 344 The answers to these questions depend on factual reconstructions of the accident and 
conclusions based on these reconstructions, upon which investigators and police experts 
disagreed. Compare NOBLE, supra note 340, at 5 (finding that the officers engaged in 
reckless tactical decision making that created the danger and the deadly force was excessive, 
unreasonable, and inconsistent with generally accepted police practices), with CIRC REPORT, 
supra note 266, at 17 (finding that the tactics used by the officers were reasonable). For 
example, there is a factual dispute among investigators and experts as to when exactly 
Officer Garmback applied the brakes in an attempt to stop the vehicle: when the officers saw 
Tamir sitting still in the gazebo with no gun visible or when Tamir allegedly picked up an 
object, put it in his waistband, and began walking out of the gazebo and toward the vehicle. 
This distinction matters for Garmback’s claim that he drove close because he thought the 
suspect would enter the recreation center and harm people inside. The CIRC investigator 
concluded that Garmback braked when he saw Tamir with a gun, that the vehicle was 
traveling about 19 mph when Garmback braked, that the officer was in control of the vehicle, 
and that he could not have anticipated his vehicle would slide on the wet grass. CIRC 
REPORT, supra note 266, at 15–17 (stating that “it was possible to clearly see a person picking 
up a weapon from the picnic table located in the gazebo”).  
 345 See IAU REPORT, supra note 265, at 6 (concluding that “Office Frank Garmback did 
not employ proper tactics when he operated the zone car up to what was reported to be an 
armed suspect, thereby violating General Police Order 2.1.01 [Use of Force]” and 
recommending that he be “disciplined”). 
 346 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 66 (emphasis added). CCPO investigators did not 
fault Garmback only because they concluded that he had intended to stop “much earlier than 
he did.” Id. at 49; see also CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 15–16 (concluding that 
Garmback intended to stop the vehicle sooner, but it slid on the wet grass). 
 347 IAU REPORT, supra note 265, at 6 (emphasis added). 
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neither considered whether the bad positioning contributed to the shooting.348 
That Garmback’s action may have increased the risk that deadly force would be 
necessary was deemed irrelevant.349 
Police expert Kimberly Crawford made this explicit in her analysis, 
concluding that whether or not “the officers enhanced [the] risk by entering the 
park and stopping their vehicle so close to a potentially armed suspect” was not 
germane to the lawfulness analysis: “Whether the officers’ actions were 
courageous or foolhardy [in driving within a few feet of the suspect] is not 
relevant to a constitutional review of the subsequent use of force.”350 Legal 
consultant S. Lamar Sims’s analysis was similar, concluding that: 
[Officer Garmback] approached and stopped in such fashion that Officer 
Loehmann was in a position of great peril—he was within feet of a gunman 
who had stood up, was approaching the police car and reaching toward his 
waistband. The officers did not create the violent situation—they were 
responding to a situation fraught with the potential for violence to citizens . . . . 
To suggest that Officer Garmback should have stopped the car at another 
location is to engage in exactly the kind of “Monday morning quarterbacking” 
the case law exhorts us to avoid.351 
The admonition to avoid “Monday morning quarterbacking” is an ironic one 
under these circumstances. While fans could be faulted for second guessing 
coaching decisions after a sports event, teams and their coaches spend hours 
doing precisely that kind of review to figure out what went wrong. My point 
here is not to fault the instant investigations for focusing their constitutional 
analysis on the moment of the shooting, as required by the current constitutional 
standard. It is to make clear that accountability review, which under current 
doctrine stops at “why” question (1), has foreclosed an entire line of inquiry that 
is crucial for preventing the next police shooting, namely, “Did the officers’ 
‘reckless approach’ which left them ‘dangerously exposed’ and put them in 
‘great peril’ significantly (and unreasonably) increase the risk that deadly force 
would be needed to protect them?” In prevention (or systemic) terms, could a 
different approach—for example, waiting for backup before engaging the 
 
 348 See id. at 9; CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 17; see also CCPO REPORT, supra note 
255, at 37–41. 
 349 See IAU REPORT, supra note 265, at 9; CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 17; see also 
CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 37–41 (arguing that “the tactics used by the police officers 
prior to the use of deadly force cannot be the basis for finding the use of deadly force itself 
unreasonable”). 
 350 CRAWFORD, supra note 254, at 6. 
 351 Sims, supra note 260, at 12–14 (referring to City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 
S. Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015)) (emphasis added). Sims’s reference to “Monday morning 
quarterbacking” reflects the Supreme Court’s warning not to judge the reasonableness of 
excessive force with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 
387 (1989); Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1777. 
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shooter or employing de-escalation techniques—have prevented the shooting 
without compromising police and public safety?352  
On the first point, recall that the officers argued they drove in quickly and 
close to engage Tamir Rice on foot and block him from entering the recreation 
center.353 This claim implicitly invoked the CPD’s “active shooter” policy, 
which permits officers to move in rapidly without backup to engage a person 
who is actively threatening others with a firearm.354  
Like virtually all police agencies, Cleveland adopted its active shooter 
policy in the wake of the Columbine school shooting.355 Before Columbine, the 
universal best practice was for patrol officers to “contain” and “control” a 
dangerous situation or person and call in a specialized SWAT team to engage 
with the shooter.356 In the Columbine incident, police from various Denver-area 
agencies responded and secured the perimeter of the school but did not enter to 
stop the shooter.357 Although police were doing exactly what they were trained 
to do, this strategy was deemed inadequate for circumstances requiring 
immediate action to halt a shooter.358 The active shooter policies adopted post-
Columbine give patrol officers the authority to approach at close range without 
backup in order to stop an individual who is actively engaged in killing people 
or attempting to kill people in a populated area.359 
The Cleveland Police Department’s policy defines an active shooter as an 
individual whose “activity and use of a firearm (or any other deadly instrument, 
device, machine, dangerous ordnance, or deadly hazard) is causing or 
attempting to cause immediate death and/or serious physical harm in a well 
populated area (target rich environment), such as a school, church, business, or 
any other public place.”360 When these circumstances occur, Cleveland police 
 
 352 See infra notes 365–71 and accompanying text. 
 353 See CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 47. 
 354 See id. at 46–47. 
 355 Id. at 46. 
 356 Id. Law enforcement agencies call this the 4Cs: Contain, Control, Communicate and 
Call SWAT. See Amaury Murgado, Movement to Contact, POLICE MAG. (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.policemag.com/channel/careers-training/articles/2013/11/movement-to-
contact.aspx [https://perma.cc/99KL-54NS]. 
 357 POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES: THE POLICE 
RESPONSE TO ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS 1 (2014). 
 358 See id. at 2 (“‘Contain and negotiate’ may be appropriate for hostage incidents or 
situations where a person is barricaded in a room and unable to harm victims. But it is not 
appropriate for active shooter incidents.”). 
 359 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 46–47. 
 360 See id. at 46 (quoting Cleveland Police Department Active Shooter Policy). The CPD 
definition is somewhat broader than the definition that has been adopted across multiple law 
enforcement agencies, including the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, which 
defines an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill 
people in a populated area,” such as a school, workplace, house of worship, transportation 
center, or other public gathering site. Active Shooter Resources, FED. BUREAU 
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/ 
active-shooter-resources [https://perma.cc/3M69-CMCN]. 
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“have the authority to and shall attempt to make immediate contact with and 
stop the active shooter.”361 The prosecutor who investigated the Tamir Rice 
shooting concluded that the officers’ actions fit within this policy because they 
faced a “potential active shooter” who was “attempting to cause death and/or 
serious physical harm” at the nearby recreation center, which was 200 feet 
away.362  
Let’s just pause here. Upon arrival at the park, the officers did not see 
terrified people running away or wounded bodies on the ground. They did not 
hear gunshots or screaming. The park was virtually empty except for the lone 
figure of Tamir Rice sitting or standing with no visible firearm. Nothing they 
witnessed would have confirmed their interpretation of the dispatcher’s 
message: that they were facing an active shooter. 
Thus, the prosecutor’s reading of the CPD was certainly a very broad one. 
By it, the policy would apply not only to actual shooters but also to potential 
shooters (which could be anyone with a gun!). Under the prosecutor’s reading, 
the officers were justified in the belief that Tamir Rice was “causing or 
attempting to cause immediate death and/or serious physical harm” at the 
moment they entered the park without backup, even though they had no 
confirmation that shots had been fired, that anyone actually had a gun, or that 
anyone had been hurt or was in danger.363  
By contrast, police expert Jeffrey Noble concluded that the active shooter 
policy had not been triggered, observing that “there were no claims that a single 
shot had been fired [or that] anyone was injured in any way, and the officers 
could see as they arrived that there was no one else in the area.”364 Invoking the 
active shooter policy under these circumstances was broadly inconsistent with 
the purpose of such policies; namely, to authorize police action when the suspect 
is actively shooting people and “even a one-minute delay in responding may 
result in multiple additional fatalities.”365 
It bears emphasis that after all the facts and expert testimony had been 
considered, the Cleveland Police Department agreed that Tamir Rice was not an 
active shooter within the meaning of the Department’s policy: it concluded that 
 
 361 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 47. 
 362 Id. Around the time of the incident the recreation center’s security video system 
recorded a few people near the entrance to the recreation center. Id. at 48. In addition, the 
prosecutor reasoned that “as an experienced First District officer, Garmback would have 
known that during business hours, the Recreation Center would be crowded with children 
and adults.” Id. at 49. 
 363 Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
 364 JEFFREY J. NOBLE, SUPPLEMENTAL PRELIMINARY EXPERT REPORT 5 (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.ecbalaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Rice.-Jeff-Noble-Supplemental 
-Report-00234880x9CCC2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENU8-GQF8]. 
 365 POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 357, at 8, 13. Every so-called “active 
shooter” event chronicled in FBI and other reports involves a person who has already started 
shooting. See generally, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 2000–2018 (2019) (listing active 
shooter incidents that took place in the United States between 2000–2018). 
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Garmback’s claim that he “had to take these actions because it was an active 
shooter situation [was] not supported by the facts.”366 
That Officers Garmback and Loehmann apparently believed they were 
following CPD’s active shooter policy under these circumstances raises broader, 
systemic questions. For example, did the active shooter policy encourage the 
officers to make a precipitous approach that increased the likelihood that deadly 
force would be required without improving officer safety or public safety? 
Police expert Jeffrey Noble answers in the affirmative.367 He concludes that 
“Officer Loehmann’s inaccurate assessment of the situation may [have been] a 
factor in his unreasonable use of deadly force.”368  
Or, to ask the question more broadly, are active shooter policies generally 
being applied in the appropriate circumstances?369 Do they conflict with de-
escalation goals? Has the more precipitous approach that is permitted by these 
policies increased the incidence of police-involved shootings in some 
circumstances where such shootings might have been avoided? Virtually no 
attention has been paid to this important, systemic question by police scholars.  
Relatedly, the invocation of the active shooter policy against a potential 
shooter foreclosed the skillful use of de-escalation techniques that might have 
diffused the threat without endangering the lives of the officers.370 In the 
language of Perrow’s theory of systems accidents, de-escalation creates slack in 
the social system by loosening the otherwise tight coupling that often 
characterizes fast-moving, uncertain police/citizen interactions.371 It gives 
police more time and creates more space for diffusing the situation without 
triggering a rapid sequence of circumstances that is hard to arrest or constrain.372 
While most large police agencies have adopted de-escalation polices,373 either 
voluntarily or under Department of Justice consent decrees,374 the meaning and 
 
 366 McGrath Letter, supra note 269, at 4. 
 367 NOBLE, supra note 364, at 5. 
 368 Id. 
 369 For a discussion of active shooter events and policies, see generally J. PETE BLAIR ET 
AL., ACTIVE SHOOTER: EVENTS AND RESPONSE (2013). 
 370 None of the investigations discussed whether de-escalation policies could have been 
used. See generally CCPO REPORT, supra note 255; IAU REPORT, supra note 265; CIRC 
REPORT, supra note 266 (all failing to discuss de-escalation techniques that could have been 
utilized). I am not aware of whether the CCPD had such a policy in place at the time of the 
Tamir Rice shooting and, if so, whether the officers had attended de-escalation training. 
 371 See PERROW, supra note 19, at 90; see also Sherman, supra note 89, at 436–37 
(describing the dangers of tight coupling in the policing context). 
 372 Police De-Escalation Training Policy Shift, POWERDMS (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.powerdms.com/blog/police-de-escalation-training-policy-shift/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z8GY-YQG3]. 
 373 Id. 
 374 These consent decrees are pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BEACON POLICE DEPARTMENT AGREEMENT, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-NY-0006-0002.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/SN4F-LW79] (holding that the BPD needed to revise its use of force policy to 
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application of de-escalation techniques continues to be debated by police 
leaders.375 Police departments that have instituted de-escalation training have 
reported drops in use-of-force incidents,376 but there is a need for systematic 
empirical studies to document the benefits (and costs) of such training. More 
robust use of de-escalation strategies may be a systems-oriented strategy that 
would reduce the risk of police-involved shooting in some contexts. 
To summarize: unlike accountability review, sentinel event review gets us 
to questions (2)−(4), forcing us to ask what features of police rules, policies, 
management and culture might have contributed to the officers’ decision to 
approach an active shooter, driving at 19 mph over wet and snowy grass, without 
backup and without adequate cover. In addition, the line of analysis I have 
constructed from the instant reports is only the beginning of a systems-oriented 
analysis. The potential causes that I have identified—along with other possible 
causes—could, in turn, implicate defects in supervision, management, training, 
or organizational culture. The goal of systems review is to identify actionable 
steps that will address not only the proximate cause, but second and third order 
causes—both human (active) and organizational (latent)—that combined with 
the proximate human cause to result in a catastrophic event. Recommendations 
 
emphasize verbal de-escalation techniques as part of an agreement to resolve the DOJ’s 
investigation of the BPD pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141). 
 375 In 2016, the Police Executive Research Forum, a prominent, policing think tank, 
published its Guiding Principles on Use of Force, which urged police agencies to “[a]dopt 
de-escalation as formal agency policy.” See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 40 (Mar. 2016). There was immediate pushback from the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), a large professional association for law 
enforcement worldwide. See Tom Jackman, National Police Groups Add ‘De-Escalation’ to 
New Model Policy on Use of Force, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/01/17/national-police-groups-add-de 
-escalation-to-new-model-policy-on-use-of-force/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/ 
T5VX-UYNY]. In 2017, however, a group of eleven national police organizations, 
including IACP, adopted a model policy that incorporated the concept of de-escalation. See 
NATIONAL CONSENSUS POLICY AND DISCUSSION PAPER ON USE OF FORCE 2–3 (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/all/no/National_Consensus_Policy_On_U
se_Of_Force.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NNH-N77P]. Several large police groups, including 
two national sheriffs’ associations and the Major Cities Chiefs Association, and PERF, 
declined to sign on to this document because it included other policies, for example, the use 
of warning shots, with which they disagreed. Jackman, supra note 375. Most states (thirty-
four total) do not mandate de-escalation training, leaving the decision whether to train up to 
local chiefs and sheriffs. Many departments do not provide such training, citing reasons such 
as cost, lack of staff, and belief that the training is unnecessary or is a rebuke to traditional 
policing. Curtis Gilbert, Not Trained to Kill, AM. PUB. MEDIA REP. (May 5, 2017), 
https://www.apmreports.org/story/2017/05/05/police-de-escalation-training [https:// 
perma.cc/45RQ-MHA3].  
 376 See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 375, at 15; see also Zaid Jilani, 
Police Officers Should Be Trained in De-Escalation. It Works, INTERCEPT (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://theintercept.com/2017/11/09/baltimore-police-deescalation-video/ [https://per 
ma.cc/3Q8W-TDFA].  
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are designed not only, or primarily, to change the behavior of human causers, 
but to make it harder for them to make mistakes. 
b. The Dispatcher’s Call 
Returning to our list of “why” questions, we are ready to tackle (5)−(6), 
which interrogate the response to “why” question (4); namely, why did the 
officers mistakenly think they were facing an active shooter? 
Why (5)? Because the officers were responding to a dispatcher’s inaccurate 
report that there was an adult male in the park who was threatening people with 
a gun.  
 
Why (6)? Because the dispatcher failed to tell police that the 911-caller had 
actually said that the gun was “probably fake and the alleged shooter was 
“probably a juvenile.” 
To get at these questions, I need to fill in the beginning of the story of what 
happened on November 22, 2014, the day that Tamir Rice was shot.377 At 
approximately 3:24 pm, a Cleveland Police dispatcher received a 911 call in 
which the caller’s initial words were, “I’m sitting here in the park . . . by the 
West Boulevard Rapid Transit Station. There’s a guy with a pistol. It’s probably 
fake, but he’s like pointing it at everybody.”378 Two more times in the course of 
a very short conversation, the caller expressed uncertainty about whether the 
gun was real, saying “It’s probably fake” and “I don’t know if it’s real or not.”379 
The caller also said the guy was “probably a juvenile.”380 
Despite the fact that the caller expressed multiple qualifications, the call-
taker did not convey these qualifications to the police dispatcher who told 
police: “Hey we have a Code-1381 at Cudell. Everybody is tied up on priorities. 
Supposed to be a guy sitting on the swings pointing a gun at people.”382 And 
again,  
Alright, it’s at Cudell Rec Center; 19, 10 West Boulevard; 1, 9, 1, 0 West 
Boulevard. [911 caller] calling. He said in the park by the Youth Center, there’s 
a black male sitting on the swing. He’s wearing a camouflage hat, a gray jacket 
with black sleeves. He keeps pulling a gun out of his pants and pointing it at 
people.383 
 
 377 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 2. 
 378 Id. 
 379 Id. at 3. 
 380 Id. For text of the entire 911 call, see id. at 2–3. 
 381 A Code-1 is the highest priority call and it “designated the incident as [posing] a 
significant public risk.” Id. at 3, 41. 
 382 Id. at 3. 
 383 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 4. 
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As a result of this message, Officers Loehmann and Garmback volunteered 
to respond to what was deemed the highest priority police call.384 They later 
testified that they believed they were responding to an “active shooter” situation, 
which under police protocols might have given them justification to approach 
the suspect without waiting for backup.385 Their expectation that the person they 
were about to encounter was an adult threatening people with a real gun shaped 
their expectations and tactical decisions as they drove into the park and 
confronted the suspect.386 When Officer Loehmann disembarked with his gun 
drawn and saw the suspect reach toward his waistband, he believed the suspect 
was now threatening him with a real gun.387 He did not know that the suspect 
was a child and the gun he was allegedly reaching for was a nonlethal “airsoft” 
gun.388 
The call-taker’s errors were prior workplace mistakes, holes in an earlier 
layer of Swiss cheese, weaknesses in the layers of protection that might have 
reduced the risk of (or prevented) the accident. The IAU investigation concluded 
that the call-taker had “failed to include [certain pertinent] information in the 
incident or to update the incident with the applicable [information],” in violation 
of Bureau of Communications and Property Control, Communications Control 
Section, Policy and Procedure Number 2012-04(VII).389  
According to police experts, procedures requiring additional questioning 
and updating reflect the necessity for call-takers to be sufficiently skeptical of 
the accuracy and veracity of the 911 caller. While information given from a 
citizen-informant who gives his or her name and phone number is considered 
the most accurate form of informant information,390 dispatchers are also trained 
to be skeptical: many 911 calls are outright false and/or contain incorrect or 
inaccurate information.391 The uncertainty conveyed in the call in this case 
 
 384 Id. at 3. 
 385 Id. at 6, 45. It is not clear that even based on the erroneous dispatch the situation 
qualified as an “active shooting” as the suspect had not shot anyone or actively threatened to 
shoot. See supra notes 362–65 and accompanying text. 
 386 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 6–7. 
 387 Id. at 6. 
 388 Id. at 2. 
 389 IAU REPORT, supra note 265, at 9–10. This policy requires the call-taker to “obtain 
the basic information and immediately send the information to the dispatcher” informing the 
caller that the call-taker “must ask a few more questions, advising [the caller] that this will 
not delay the information being sent to the dispatcher or the responding zone car.” Id. at 9. 
The call-taker is to “gather pertinent information on the critical call and update the incident 
as needed.” Id. at 9–10. 
 390 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 42 (citing LEWIS R. KATZ, OHIO ARREST, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE 93 § 2:22 (2015 ed.) (concluding that the officers had probable cause that the 
suspect had violated Ohio’s felonious assault statute by taking a gun out and pointing it at 
people)). 
 391 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 340, at 9. Officer Clark, who was retained by the Rice 
family in their § 1983 suit against the City of Cleveland, see CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, 
at 31, had 40 years of experience in law enforcement. CLARK, supra note 340, at 2, 9. As a 
former supervisor in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department communications center, 
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would have required, at a minimum, a means for the informant to make contact 
with the dispatched units to vet the information the dispatcher had received.392 
This was especially important given that Tamir was dressed in fairly ordinary 
clothing,393 which would have made it more difficult to identify him quickly and 
increased the risk of misidentification. The dispatcher should have instructed 
the informant to move to a safe place and remain on the line to provide accurate 
information or point out the target to police officers.394 
The call-taker also failed to convey to the dispatcher and thus to police 
officers converging on the scene the specific uncertainties the 911 caller had 
expressed when calling in the alleged threat, namely that the person he had 
observed might be a kid (“juvenile”) playing around with a toy (“fake”) gun.395 
According to Assistant County Prosecutor Matthew Meyer who reviewed the 
entire episode for the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office, if the officers had 
received this “critical information,” they “would not have considered this 
incident to have been so serious and almost certainly would have used different 
tactics.”396 The information the officers received from the dispatcher “led the 
two responding officers to believe that a [grown] man with a real gun was 
threatening innocent people’s lives at a recreation center.”397 Their mistaken 
beliefs distorted their assessment of the risks posed, shaped their tactical 
choices, and negatively impacted their response to Tamir’s actions. When Tamir 
“unexpectedly moved in their direction and began pulling the gun from his 
waistband, the officers had no idea that it was fake or that Tamir was only 
twelve.”398 
 
he was well acquainted with the danger of “false alarms” and the safeguards necessary to 
ensure that reliable information is obtained and dispatched with precision to field units. Id. 
at 9. In his view, the dispatcher’s report was “grossly incomplete.” Id. 
 392 Id. at 9. 
 393 See CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 3. The caller said the black male had on “a 
gray coat with black sleeves,” “gray pants,” and a “camouflage hat.” Id.  
 394 See CLARK, supra note 340, at 8. 
 395 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 69.  
 396 See News 5 Cleveland, Full Press Conference: Grand Jury Declines to Indict Officer 
who Shot 12-year-old Tamir Rice in Clev, YOUTUBE (Dec. 28, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7GZFbEm2eo [https://perma.cc/4XZZ-UGSK] 
(reporting by Assistant County Prosecutor Matthew Meyer with quoted material at 39:00–
39:23). The IAU investigator recommended that the call-taker be disciplined for her failure 
to “include the information [that the suspect might be a juvenile and the gun might be fake] 
in the incident or to update the incident with the applicable [information].” IAU REPORT, 
supra note 265, at 10. This failure violated police policy concerning how incidents are to be 
reported and updated. See id. The CIRC also concluded that the call-taker “may have 
violated” police policy. See CIRC REPORT, supra note 266, at 19. In discussing the effect of 
the erroneous dispatch message, CIRC investigators noted: “From [the officers’] perspective 
they were preparing to respond to the call for a male with a gun pointing it at people.” Id. at 
17. 
 397 News 5 Cleveland, supra note 396, at 53:08–53:24. 
 398 Id. at 53:24–53:38. 
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Neither the IAU investigation nor the CIRC investigation (nor most of the 
police experts who reviewed the case) adequately discussed the possible causal 
link between the erroneous dispatch information the officers received and their 
use of deadly force in the park.399 This is a crucial omission if the goal is to 
avoid the next tragic shooting. It again points out the limitations of 
accountability review.  
Two police experts did consider a possible link—concluding there was 
none—but for conflicting reasons. Police expert Ken Katsaris concluded that 
the omitted information was “irrelevant to the deadly force decision” because at 
the precise point when Tamir Rice appeared to be reaching for his waistband 
“the only objectively reasonable decision to be made by Loehmann was to 
utilize deadly force and deploy his firearm.”400 Police expert Roger Clark agreed 
that the dispatch was irrelevant but for a different reason. He reasoned that even 
based upon what Officer Loehmann did know “it was unreasonable for him 
(Loehmann) to jump out with his gun drawn and immediately open fire within 
1.7 seconds at a person he could not be sure was the subject of the dispatch.”401 
Crucially, both experts applied a very narrow timeframe—the exact moment of 
the shooting—in finding the erroneous dispatch causally irrelevant. 
One last piece of the puzzle is that the erroneous dispatch was the first step 
in the causal chain that led Officers Garmback and Loehmann to apply the 
department’s “active shooter” policy.402 As noted earlier, this was a crucial 
judgment: the police officers believed it permitted, indeed compelled them to 
act more aggressively, more quickly, and without waiting for backup. 
Approaching an armed and dangerous individual at close range without backup 
would obviously have increased the risk that the officers would find it necessary 
 
 399 The IAU REPORT recommended punishment for the call-taker’s failure accurately to 
convey all relevant information to the officers, but did not connect it to the shooting. IAU 
REPORT, supra note 265, at 10. The CIRC Report noted in passing that the erroneous 
transmission led the officers to believe “they were preparing to respond to the call for a male 
with a gun pointing it at people,” but did not pursue this connection further. CIRC REPORT, 
supra note 266, at 17 (recommending follow-up training for dispatchers involved, including 
training on following correct procedures for documenting incoming information, but not how 
to handle unclear reporting from a 911 caller). The CCPO Report came the closest to 
connecting the erroneous dispatch with the shooting, noting that the reasonableness of the 
officers’ actions must be judged based on their “tragically mistaken [view] about the key 
facts of the case.” CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 69. The conclusion that the officers had 
acted lawfully, however, marked the end of the legal inquiry with no further need to 
interrogate the causal connections for purpose of prevention. See id. at 69–70.  
 400 W. KEN KATSARIS, REPORT AND OPINIONS OF W. KEN KATSARIS POLICE 
CONSULTANT AND TRAINER: USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY CLEVELAND AND POLICE OFFICER 
TIMOTHY LOEHMANN RESULTING IN DEATH OF TAMIR E. RICE ON NOVEMBER 22, 2014, at 7 
(Nov. 2015), http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/en-US/Tamir%20 
Rice%20Investigation/Katsaris%20Report%20on%20Tamir%20Rice_Redacted.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/SCJ6-GUQD]. 
 401 CLARK, supra note 340, at 10. 
 402 Police expert Jeffrey Noble disagreed that the circumstances triggered the CPD’s 
active shooter police. See supra notes 362–65 and accompanying text. 
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to use deadly force against the suspect.403 It should be clear that a contain-and-
wait-for-backup strategy might have produced a different result than a strategy 
designed to neutralize a potentially dangerous gunman: if the officers had 
received the correct information about the suspect, sought backup to secure the 
recreation center, taken more time to consider their approach, and kept in touch 
with the dispatcher, the situation might have resolved without a shooting. If so, 
the dispatcher’s error that led to the designation “active shooter” may have 
played a decisive role in the shooting of Tamir Rice.  
In a true systems review, my linear analysis of questions (5)–(6) would have 
been supplemented by an exploration of additional possible causes for the 
dispatcher’s actions: was there a policy in place that led the dispatcher to decline 
to pass on information she was unsure of? Was the dispatcher operating without 
clear guidance on how to handle transmission of disputed or unclear 
information? Was there a policy in place, but the dispatcher was inadequately 
trained on that policy? Did the dispatcher fail to disclose out of fear that if she 
cast doubt on whether the gun was real, police might place themselves in 
danger? Was the dispatcher distracted, inattentive or careless as a result of 
personal circumstances (e.g., fatigue) or workplace conditions (e.g., low 
morale)? Any of these causes could, in turn, lead to additional “why” questions 
and ultimately to additional human or systems causes that could be addressed 
by remedial recommendations.  
V. THE PROMISE OF SENTINEL EVENT/SYSTEMS REVIEW IN POLICING 
The purpose of my discussion in the prior section was to identify and answer 
some of the “why” questions that sentinel event review might tackle. While my 
analysis relied on the information contained in the instant investigations, it 
differed from the administrative and legal investigations of the Tamir Rice 
shooting in at least three important ways: First, my analysis expanded the causal 
timeframe. It went behind the proximal human causer to ferret out second and 
third level causes outside the narrow time frame of the immediate causer’s 
actions. In addition, rather than asking whether each human causer was 
blameworthy for violating a law or policy applicable to their specific area of 
 
 403 As noted earlier, where activity poses a serious risk to public safety, most police 
departments have shifted from a “contain-and-wait-for-backup strategy” towards a policy 
that authorizes the first police responders to “quickly engage and attempt to neutralize active 
shooters.” CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 46 (citing Anderson Cooper, Responding to an 
Active Shooter, 60 MINUTES (Nov. 22, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
responding-to-an-active-shooter-60-minutes-anderson-cooper/ [https://perma.cc/J3 
BW-SB62]). The CPD defined an active shooter as one whose “activity and use of a firearm 
(or any other deadly instrument, device, machine, dangerous ordnance [sic], or deadly 
hazard) is causing or attempting to cause immediate death and/or serious bodily harm in a 
well populated area (target rich environment), such as a school, church, business, or any 
other public place.” Id. 
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responsibility, I asked how their conduct ultimately contributed to the end result: 
the tragic shooting of an unarmed boy.  
Second, the analysis went behind individual human errors to ask what kinds 
of latent systemic causes might lie behind them, including error-producing 
conditions in the workplace—such as low morale, fatigue, poor police training, 
or inadequate equipment—and organizational factors—such as management 
decisions, organizational processes, and corporate culture.404  
Finally, the ultimate purpose of my inquiry was not primarily to identify 
errors made by individual actors in order to sanction them. Its purpose, rather, 
was to identify systems-oriented barriers and defenses that could reduce the risk 
of the kinds of human errors that may have occurred. 
Detailed investigation of particular, harm-causing events of this sort has 
been an essential feature of systems review in commercial aviation and 
medicine.405 Recall, however, that the dramatic advances in safety in these 
contexts depends upon additional analysis that goes beyond single incident 
review. Risk management experts have learned to use the insights gleaned from 
particular, sentinel event reviews to uncover patterns of repeated, similar errors 
that were found to have caused repeated, similar accidents.406 This pattern 
evidence has then been employed by risk managers to formulate systems-
oriented solutions to address the repeated errors.407 It is this pattern-identifying 
analysis that is responsible for the dramatic advances in safety in commercial 
aviation and medicine.408 
In Part A, below, I next identify some features of the Tamir Rice shooting 
that have recurred in other police shootings, and thus may call for systems-
oriented solutions. I can only gesture in this direction, however. It would 
ultimately fall to policing experts to identify errors and corresponding points of 
systems vulnerability, and then formulate and implement solutions designed to 
address these failures. Then, in Part B, I broaden the discussion beyond the 
Tamir Rice shooting. I discuss systems-oriented solutions suggested by data-
informed analysis of demographic and circumstantial features of police 
shootings writ large.  
 
 404 This is why broadening the timeframe in Fourth Amendment analysis would be 
helpful, but not sufficient. As noted above, some circuits have permitted claimants to include, 
in their excessive force claim, circumstances that preceded the actual moment of the 
shooting. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. This could permit a court to consider 
whether reckless or unreasonable tactical decisions prior to the shooting unreasonably 
increased the risk that deadly force would be necessary. For example, in an excessive force 
claim against Officer Loehmann, it might have permitted a court to consider Loehmann’s 
role in the decision to drive the patrol car so close to Tamir that it put the officers in danger. 
For obvious reasons, however, even the broader timeframe would not yield the same benefits 
as root cause analysis, which not only broadens the timeframe, but includes consideration of 
second and third level causes not directly related to Officer Loehmann’s actions. 
 405 See supra Parts III.A–B. 
 406 See supra Part III.C. 
 407 See, e.g., Kapur et al., supra note 130, at 7. 
 408 See id. 
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A. Beyond the Single Incident 
Comparing the Tamir Rice case with other incidents of police-involved 
shootings suggests some repeated circumstances that may increase the risk of 
police shootings. I have already discussed two such circumstances; namely, 
circumstances involving active shooters and circumstances that might call for 
de-escalation strategies. Comparing police responses in multiple contexts 
involving the invocation of active shooter policies could lead to systemic lessons 
for safer, more effective use of police force. Similarly, comparing the use of de-
escalation strategies in multiple contexts could enhance police learning about 
best practices in diffusing potentially dangerous confrontations. 
A third systemic factor that contributed to the shooting of Tamir Rice was 
a breakdown in communication at several points. The first was the transfer of 
erroneous information between the dispatcher and the police officers, which led 
them to think they were facing an adult, active shooter with an actual gun.409 
The second communication breakdown was Officer Garmback’s failure to 
coordinate his approach with another police vehicle that was in the area and was 
formally assigned to the jurisdiction in which the park was located.410 Garmback 
failed to report his arrival time to the dispatcher and neglected to make radio 
contact at any time prior to the shooting.411 As Garmback’s disciplinary letter 
framed it:  
No one knew where you were or what you were doing, and you did not know 
where anyone else was or what they were doing, until after the shooting 
occurred. . . . You never requested instructions from the primary car or 
otherwise coordinated your efforts with the primary car. You never gave the 
primary car the opportunity to decide on the best strategy.412 
Had Garmback communicated his location, the other officers—who arrived 
at the park only a few minutes later—could have provided backup, which might 
have changed the chosen approach and created space for de-escalation 
strategies. 
Significantly, communication breakdown among team members is one of 
the most significant systemic causes of accidents that has been identified by risk 
management experts in commercial aviation and medicine.413 Airlines have 
 
 409 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 69. 
 410 McGrath Letter, supra note 269, at 2. 
 411 Id. 
 412 Id. at 3. 
 413 See, e.g., Helmreich, supra note 176, at 781 (arguing that pilots and doctors have 
“common interpersonal problem areas and similarities in professional culture” including the 
breakdown of communication); MACRAE, supra note 157, at 96 (concluding that 
“[c]ommunication problems are regularly found to be key contributors to adverse events and 
accidents”); A.J. Starmer et al., Changes in Medical Errors After Implementation of a 
Handoff Program, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1803, 1803 (2014) (identifying 
“miscommunications” as a “leading cause of serious medical errors”). 
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sought to address the risks of miscommunication in the cockpit or between pilots 
and other airline personnel by requiring airline employees to undergo Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) training.414 CRM training can be traced back to 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration research, which identified 
human error resulting from failures of interpersonal communications, decision 
making and leadership as a major cause of air crashes.415 CRM is a set of 
instructional strategies aimed at reducing human error and increasing the 
effectiveness of flight crews by improving teamwork in the cockpit.416 While it 
is difficult to establish a clear causal link between CRM training and airline 
safety, studies demonstrate a positive effect on attitudes, knowledge, and safety-
enhancing behavior.417  
Medical experts have sought to replicate the CRM program in the medical 
context, particularly among personnel in the operating room.418 Hospitals have 
also sought to improve communication by standardizing what is communicated 
when patients are “handed off” from one medical person to another, with 
dramatic reduction of medical errors.419  
Police officers, like commercial aviation personnel and medical personnel, 
work in teams, which include other officers, administrative personnel, 
dispatchers, etc. Miscommunication and misunderstanding among members of 
the policing team and uncertainty about who is in charge have contributed to 
many tragic scenarios in the policing context.420  
 
 414 Robert L. Helmreich et al., The Evolution of Crew Resource Management Training 
in Commercial Aviation, 9 INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCHOL. 19, 19 (1999). 
 415 Id. 
 416 Paul O’Connor et al., Crew Resource Management Training Effectiveness: A Meta-
Analysis and Some Critical Needs, 18 INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCHOL., 353, 353–54 (2008). 
 417 Eduardo Salas et al., Does Crew Resource Management Training Work? An Update, 
an Extension, and Some Critical Needs, 48 HUM. FACTORS 392, 410 (2006). 
 418 See, e.g., Kapur et al., supra note 130, at 5 (arguing that communication failures may 
be more likely to occur in healthcare than in aviation cockpit settings and suggesting that 
some healthcare settings may benefit from implementation of aviation procedures); Leonie 
Seager et al., Applying Aviation Factors to Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery—The Human 
Element, 51 BRITISH J. ORAL MAXILLOFACIAL SURGERY 8, 8 (2013) (identifying features of 
crew resource management training that could readily be applied to healthcare settings). 
 419 See generally Starmer et al., supra note 413 (describing multicenter study assessing 
programs de-signed to improve handoff of information about patient care). 
 420 See generally Kimberly Kindy, The Post Asked Experts to Examine 5 Viral Videos 
of Police Shootings. Here’s Their Analysis, WASH. POST (July 22, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/the-post-asked-experts-to-examine-5-viral 
-videos-of-police-shootings-heres-their-analysis/2016/07/22/47a0a446-4df2-11e6-a4 
22-83ab49ed5e6a_story.html [https://perma.cc/2J4X-67BS] (pointing out breakdowns 
in communication that contributed to lethal police-involved shootings); see also Barbara E. 
Armacost, The Organizational Reasons Why Police Departments Don’t Change, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Aug. 19, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/the-organizational-reasons-police-
departments-dont-change [https://perma.cc/2ZCA-HZ87]. One tragic and notorious 
example of a lethal breakdown in communication between officers and the suspect and 
among the officers on the scene is the shooting of Amadou Diallo on February 4, 1999. See 
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Finally, the Tamir Rice shooting raises the broader question of mistakes 
caused by realistic-looking, nonlethal guns. In 2016, the Washington Post did 
an analysis of police shootings involving “ultra-real-looking pellet guns, toy 
weapons and non-functioning replicas.”421 According to the Washington Post’s 
database of fatal police shootings, over the two years prior to the article’s 
publication, police had shot and killed eighty-six people in such encounters.422 
Half of these shootings occurred at night.423 Police report that in sixty cases the 
suspect pointed the gun at them, and in virtually all of the cases the suspect 
failed to comply with their instructions.424 Significantly, in a large percentage 
of these cases—thirty-eight out of eighty-six—the suspect had a history of 
mental illness.425 Ten of the shootings began as robberies426 and fourteen 
resulted from calls of domestic disturbances.427 Over the years, however, a 
significant number of police shootings involving imitation firearms have 
involved individuals who were not committing crimes, some of whom were 
young children.428 
In 1988, Congress passed legislation that required a bright orange barrel on 
some imitation firearms, including water guns, many replicas and Airsoft guns 
that fire nonmetallic projectile, but it exempted BB guns, pellet guns, and 
replicas of antique firearms.429 Subsequent studies mandated by federal law to 
study whether the mandated orange barrels would prevent shootings found that 
the markings did not help police distinguish between toy guns and real guns.430 
 
generally Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are 
Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/  
02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-diallo-shooting-are-acquitted-all-
charges.html [https://perma.cc/86C4-AGU8] (describing chaotic use of firearms by four 
officers against unarmed Diallo in his apartment vestibule). 
 421 John Sullivan et al., In Two Years, Police Killed 86 People Brandishing Guns that 
Look Real—But Aren’t, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
investigations/in-two-years-police-killed-86-people-brandishing-guns-that-look-real-
-but-arent/2016/12/18/ec005c3a-b025-11e6-be1c-8cec35b1ad25story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/CEA9-4N9B]. 
 422 Id. 
 423 Id. 
 424 Id. 
 425 Id. 
 426 Id. According to a 1990 study of shootings involving toy or immigration firearms, a 
nontrivial number involved suspects who were using them to commit crimes such as robbery 
and assault. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, TOY GUNS: INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME AND ENCOUNTERS WITH POLICE viii (June 
1990) [hereinafter TOY GUNS]. This study found that fifteen percent of all robberies are 
perpetrated with fake firearms. Id. 
 427 Sullivan et al., supra note 421. 
 428 See id. For example, five-year-old Patrick Andrew Mason was shot by a police officer 
who came to do a welfare check and mistook a child with a red gun for a burglar. Id. 
 429 Id. 
 430 See TOY GUNS, supra note 426, at viii–ix; KENNETH CARLSON & PETER FINN, ABT 
ASSOCIATES INC., TEST OF THE VISIBILITY OF TOY AND REPLICA HANDGUN MARKINGS x 
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Police confirm that it is “virtually impossible” to train officers to distinguish 
between actual guns and imitations from a distance.431 They are trained to treat 
anything that looks like a gun as a potential lethal threat, regardless of what the 
suspect may try to claim.432  
The risk created by imitation firearms cries out for a systemic, legislative 
solution. One possibility would be to mandate that the entire surface of all toy 
guns and BB guns be painted a bright color, as California state law requires.433 
Of course, it remains to be seen whether police officers are able to distinguish 
the bright colors at a distance or at night. Eleven states, the District of Columbia 
and Puerto Rico have banned imitation firearms or imposed restrictions on their 
use.434 The cities of Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Maryland, and Boston, 
Massachusetts have outlawed imitation firearms in public.435 The risk posed by 
the ubiquity of imitation firearms, some made by manufacturers who advertise 
their imitation guns as “carbon copies” of their most popular lethal firearms, 
cannot be addressed at the level of the individual police agency.436 It requires a 
systemic, legislative solution. 
A final, intractable, systemic issue raised by the shooting of Tamir Rice is 
the fact that the twelve-year-old was assumed by most everyone on the scene to 
have been an adult.437 This mistake traces back to the initial 911 caller who was 
 
(Aug. 1989), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/digitization/146870NCJRS.pdf  [https:// 
perma.cc/CWQ9-VTUZ]. 
 431 Sullivan et al., supra note 421. 
 432 See TOY GUNS, supra note 426, at ix. During site visits by PERF investigators 
conducting the study referenced in note 426, police officers described a “Shoot/Don’t Shoot” 
training video in which the suspect appears with a gun and says something like “Don’t shoot, 
it’s a toy.” When the officer stands down, the suspect shoots the officer. This training 
illustrates why police are taught to assume that any object that looks like a firearm is a real 
weapon. Id. 
 433 Sullivan et al., supra note 421. In 2015, Sen. Barbara Boxer (D. Cal.) introduced a 
bill that would have mandated the California solution as a matter of federal law, but the bill 
stalled in committee. Id. 
 434 See Kevin Frazzini, Fracas over Fakes, 42 ST. LEGISLATURES 8, 8 (2016). 
 435 Luke Broadwater & Yvonne Wenger, Baltimore OKs Ban of Replica Guns, BALT. 
SUN (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-
replica-guns-20161114-story.html [https://perma.cc/LV98-6FM4]; Trisha Thadani, 
Boston Bans Replica Guns in Public Places, USA TODAY (Nov. 10, 2015), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/11/10/boston-toy-guns/75487896/ 
[https://perma.cc/9S9J-L5LJ]. 
 436 See, e.g., Air Pistols, SIG SAUER, https://www.sigsauer.com/products/airguns/ 
pistols/ [https://perma.cc/VSQ5-CCGL]. 
 437 CCPO REPORT, supra note 255, at 3. Both Officers Loehmann and Garmback thought 
twelve-year-old Tamir was over eighteen years old. Id. at 6–7. Detective Lentz, who arrived 
on the scene immediately after Tamir was shot, thought the boy was seventeen or eighteen. 
Id. at 8. Patrol Officer Ken Zverina and Patrol Officer Ricardo Roman, who were in the area 
and arrived on the scene six minutes after the shooting described Tamir as “18–20 years old” 
and “early twenties” respectively. Id. at 10–11. Two other officers who responded to the 
report of shots fired, Louis Kitko and Chuck Judd, stated that Tamir looked to be somewhere 
between eighteen and twenty years old. Id. at 11–12. 
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unsure whether Tamir was a “juvenile.”438 The systemic nature of the error is 
reflected in social science studies showing that black boys are routinely 
misperceived as older than they actually are, including by police.439 For 
example, in one study black thirteen-year-old boys were routinely 
mischaracterized as adults by police officer participants from a large urban 
police department.440 The average age error for thirteen-year-old black boys was 
4.59 years!441 The overestimation of age was correlated with police assumptions 
that the black, juvenile suspects were more culpable than white boys of the same 
age.442 Significantly, it was also correlated with a higher level of use of force by 
police against black male children, controlling for how much the suspects 
resisted arrest or were located in high-crime areas.443  
Devising systemic solutions for racial disparities of this sort is a huge 
challenge. Some police departments have initiated programs to address implicit 
racial bias through educational training, with mixed success for lasting 
change.444 Police departments in many cities have also sought to create more 
racially mixed departments to better reflect the demographics of their 
communities.445 Community oriented policing—where officers walk the 
neighborhood on foot or otherwise become involved with neighborhood 
youth—means that police are more likely to know or recognize the juveniles in 
the areas they patrol. This strategy could mitigate the kind of mistakes that 
contributed to Tamir’s death. At the end of the day, though, structural racism is 
one of our nation’s biggest challenges in contexts that go well beyond policing. 
A more detailed account is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 
 438 Id. at 3. 
 439 Goff et al., supra note 331, at 530–35. 
 440 See id. at 535. 
 441 See id. at 534–35. The study focused on black boys rather black than girls on the 
ground that black boys were more likely to become involved in criminal activity. Id. at 528. 
 442 See id. at 534. 
 443 See id. at 535. Significantly, these racial disparities were predicted by measures of 
dehumanization but not by traditional measures of explicit or implicit bias. Id. 
Dehumanization is “the denial of full humanness to others,” meaning that social protections 
from violence can be removed. Id. at 527 (quoting Nick Haslam, Dehumanization: An 
Integrative View, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 252, 252 (2006)). The general 
association between a group and “animals” is one form of dehumanization. Id. at 528. For 
example, the association of African-Americans with great apes. Id. 
 444 For an optimistic assessment by a former police officer turned lawyer that 
“sophisticated training could lead to more accurate threat identifications, correcting for racial 
bias that officers may not even be aware of,” see Seth Stoughton, How Police Training 
Contributes to Avoidable Deaths, ATLANTIC (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic 
.com/national/archive/2014/12/police-gun-shooting-training-ferguson/383681/ [https 
://perma.cc/HQW5-U7U9]. 
 445 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & EQUAL EMPLOY’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ADVANCING 
DIVERSITY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 36–46 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-
document/file/900761/download [https://perma.cc/WZH7-UZLE]. 
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B. Data-Informed Analysis: Looking for Patterns in Police Shootings 
The identification of system vulnerabilities in the circumstances leading up 
to the shooting of Tamir Rice and the effort to identify similar vulnerabilities in 
other police shootings illustrates the way a single incident can be mined for 
potential pan-incident vulnerabilities and corresponding pan-incident solutions. 
But analyzing specific incidents is only one strategy for this. 
A second strategy is to analyze the wide range of accessible statistical data 
that is currently available on police shootings for patterns that suggest potential 
systemic changes. This kind of research and analysis, focusing specifically on 
systems-oriented interventions, are still in their infancy. One of the most 
thorough recent studies along these lines is Franklin Zimring’s 2017 book, When 
Police Kill, made possible by newly accessible statistical data from two 
websites, both launched in 2015 to keep detailed data on police shootings.446 
For many years the FBI and the Centers for Disease Prevention were the 
only available sources of data on the incidence and circumstances of police-
involved fatal shootings. Government officials have admitted that these data, 
which depend on voluntary reporting,447 were and are woefully inadequate and 
incomplete.448 In 2015, the Washington Post and the Guardian (a British daily 
newspaper) each launched databases designed to keep better records of police-
involved shootings.449  
 
 446 See ZIMRING, supra note 249, at 43.  
 447 The FBI publishes an annual “justifiable homicide by law enforcement” count using 
data voluntarily supplied by police departments. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM: 2019.1 
NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM USER MANUAL 33 (2018), 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ucr/ucr-2019-1-nibrs-user-manual.pdf [https://pe 
rma.cc/4D9B-FXS5]. Recently, the Justice Department announced that it is trying out a 
new open-source system to count officer-involving shootings. Oliver Laughland et al., 
Justice Department Trials System to Count Killings by US Law Enforcement, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/05/justice-department-
trials-system-count-killings-us-law-enforcement-the-counted [https://perma.cc/ETE3 
-HPD2]. The program is being run by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Id. This new “hybrid” 
system—combining open source data with a survey of local authorities—resulted in a count 
that was more than twice the rate previously reported by the FBI. Jon Swaine & Ciara 
McCarthy, Killings by US Police Logged at Twice the Previous Rate under New Federal 
Program, GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/ 
15/us-police-killings-department-of-justice-program [https://perma.cc/AU2Z-RGJH]. 
See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARREST-RELATED 
DEATHS PROGRAM REDESIGN STUDY, 2015–16: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS (2016).  
 448 Mark Tran, FBI Chief: ‘Unacceptable’ that Guardian Has Better Data on Police 
Violence, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/ 
08/fbi-chief-says-ridiculous-guardian-washington-post-better-information-police-sho 
otings [https://perma.cc/J8LE-SLCX]. 
 449 Julie Tate et al., How the Washington Post Is Examining Police Shootings in the 
United States, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ 
how-the-washington-post-is-examining-police-shootings-in-the-united-states/2016/ 
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The Washington Post began compiling a database of every fatal shooting in 
the United States by a police officer in the line of duty.450 The Post tracks more 
than a dozen details about each killing, including the race of the victim, the 
circumstances of the shooting, and whether the person was armed or 
experiencing a mental health crisis.451 It obtains the information for the database 
from local news reports, law enforcement websites, social media, and by 
monitoring independent databases such as Killed by Police and Fatal 
Encounters.452  
The Guardian’s website—“The Counted”—is an interactive database that 
uses a “verified crowdsourcing model to record fatal encounters through sixteen 
data points.”453 The Guardian has also published a series of long form 
investigations into recurring police use of force issues identified by analysis of 
the data.454  
Police scholars urging systems-oriented review in policing have begun to 
rely on these databases to identify trends and patterns associated with increased 
 
07/07/d9c52238-43ad-11e6-8856-f26de2537a9d_story.html [on file with the author]; 
Oliver Laughland & Jamiles Lartey, Counting Police Killings in the US: Landmark Stories 
that Led to Change, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/dec/09/counting-police-killings-landmark-stories [https://perma.cc/B8WF 
-4JCN]. 
 450 Tate et al., supra note 449. 
 451 Id. 
 452 Id. In 2016, the Post began gathering additional information by filing open records 
requests with police departments. “More than a dozen additional details are being collected 
about officers in each shooting,” and the “[o]fficers’ names are being included in the 
database after The Post contacts the departments to request comment.” Id. 
 453 Laughland & Lartey, supra note 449; see also The Counted: About the Project, 
GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/about-
the-counted [https://perma.cc/84LY-3MJV] (“The Counted is a project by The 
Guardian—and you—working to count the number of people killed by police and other law 
enforcement agencies in the United States throughout 2015 and 2016, to monitor their 
demographics and to tell the stories of how they died.”). 
 454 See generally The Counted, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/series/counted-us-police-killings-us-database [https://perma.cc/56X9-7DUM]. 
The series includes investigations of police shooting into moving vehicles, police shootings 
of suicidal victims, the deadly use of Tasers, and a five-part investigation into Kern County, 
California, which had the highest rate of officer-involved deaths in the United States in 2015. 
Jon Swaine et al., Moving Targets, GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.the 
guardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/01/moving-targets-police-shootings-vehicles-the-
counted [https://perma.cc/88YM-B42A]; Jon Swaine & Jamiles Lartey, Forced to Fire: 
Are US Police Hiding Behind ‘Suicide by Cop’ Shootings?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/06/suicide-by-cop-the-counted 
[https://perma.cc/L5WG-5LA7]; Oliver Laughland et al., Bolts from the Blue, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/05/police-tasers-
deaths-the-counted [https://perma.cc/EE2M-ZJHG]; Jon Swaine & Oliver Laughland, 
The County: The Story of America’s Deadliest Police, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/01/the-county-kern-county-deadliest-
police-killings [https://perma.cc/CZ5A-4D8G]. 
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risk of police shootings.455 Perhaps the most comprehensive is Franklin 
Zimring’s book-length analysis of police-shooting data.456 One of the most 
important goals of Zimring’s analysis is to find systems-oriented strategies that 
reduce police shootings of civilians—even legally justified ones—without 
compromising police safety.457 So, for example, his recommendations for 
empirical research call for studies that encompass both investigations on the 
character and causes of police use of fatal force and research on minimizing 
threats to police from life-threatening incidents while on duty: “Testing the 
current assumptions about what threatens police and searching for tactics and 
limitations on police force that can reduce civilian death rates at no cost to police 
safety are the central tasks of policy research on police use of deadly force.”458 
For Zimring, the most important strategy for decreasing the use of deadly 
force by armed police officers is clear restrictions on the circumstances in which 
and the extent to which police are permitted to use force.459 In getting at what 
such restrictions should look like, a key question is what kinds of police/citizen 
interactions result in the highest incidence of police shootings. One systemic 
strategy would be to reduce, when possible, the kinds of police/citizen 
interactions that increase this risk.460 
Zimring used 2015 data from the Guardian website to answer the 
police/citizen interaction question posed above.461 His analysis revealed that 
while most of the categories of citizen activity resulting in police-involved 
shootings involved relatively serious, criminal activities (criminal investigation, 
crime in progress, arrest in progress, serving warrants, armed and dangerous, 
shots fired), fully nine percent of shootings—approximately 100 deaths per 
 
 455 See Sherman, supra note 89, at 428 (first citing David Klinger, Social Theory and 
the Street Cop: The Case of Deadly Force, IDEAS IN AM. POLICING 1, 1–15 (2005); and then 
citing Jordan C. Pickering & David A. Klinger, Enhancing Police Legitimacy by Promoting 
Safety Culture, in THE POLITICS OF POLICING: BETWEEN FORCE AND LEGITIMACY 21, 21–39 
(Mathieu Deflem ed., 2016)). 
 456 See generally ZIMRING, supra note 249.  
 457 See id. at 162. 
 458 Id. 
 459 Id. at 227, 231. 
 460 For a similar recommendation, see Schwartz, supra note 243, at 546; see also Conor 
Friedersdorf, End Needless Interactions with Police Officers During Traffic Stops, 
ATLANTIC (July 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/end-
needless-interaction-with-cops-during-traffic-stops/490412/ [https://perma.cc/GJ3G-
PV3L] (“A broken taillight does not require armed agents of the state to approach a 
motorist’s window.”); Christopher Kutz, Op-Ed: For a Safer America, Curtail Traffic Stops, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0813-kutz-
traffic-stops-20150812-story.html [https://perma.cc/6RVA-8TCR] (arguing that traffic 
stops pose substantial danger to police officers, risk escalation, and confrontation with no 
corresponding increase in road safety). 
 461 ZIMRING, supra note 249, at 43.  
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year—occurred after a traffic stop.462 This was despite the fact that individuals 
who are shot during a traffic stop are disproportionately unlikely to be armed.463  
While police officers are relatively unlikely to be injured or killed during 
routine traffic stops, the “dominant narrative” in policing is that traffic stops are 
fraught with hidden, unpredictable danger.464 Jordan Blair Woods describes 
how police academies “show officer trainees videos of the most extreme cases 
of violence against officers during routine traffic stops in order to stress that 
mundane police work can quickly turn into a deadly situation if they become 
complacent on the scene or hesitate to use force.”465 According to police 
magazines and websites, traffic stops figure prominently in law enforcement 
training videos because “the traffic stop remains one of the most dangerous 
aspects of police work.”466 Given their training, it is not surprising that traffic 
stops create stress and anxiety and police approach them ready for action. 
Joanna Schwartz frames it this way: “As an officer is walking up to the car 
window, he is likely to be primed for the possibility that the person he has 
stopped is armed and dangerous, and that he may need to make a split-second 
decision about whether to use force.”467 This creates precisely the kind of 
“cognitive strain that heightens implicit biases and makes error more likely.”468 
Given these realities, Zimring’s observation is important: while many of the 
risk-creating police/citizen interactions he identified are impossible to avoid 
because they involve serious criminal activity, it would be possible to reduce the 
incidence of traffic stops. For example, police could use cameras more widely, 
i.e. to identify and ticket not only speeders and red-light violators, but also 
individuals with minor violations such as broken taillights. One creative solution 
for minor traffic offenses is for police to pull up behind an automobile, 
photograph the license plate and log a ticket to that license plate by computer.469 
The key point here is that it makes sense to reduce the incidence of routine traffic 
 
 462 Id. at 52−53. 
 463 See Ben Montgomery, Why Cops Shoot, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), 
http://www.tampabay.com/projects/2017/investigations/florida-police-shootings/why 
-cops-shoot/ [https://perma.cc/VN6S-8KJC]. A study of shootings during traffic stops in 
Florida found that almost seventy percent of the people shot during traffic stops were 
unarmed. Id. 
 464 Jordan Blair Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic Stops, 117 
MICH. L. REV. 635, 637 (2019) (surveying police training literature emphasizing the danger 
of traffic stops). 
 465 Id. at 638 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 466 Dean Scoville, The Hazards of Traffic Stops, POLICE MAG. (Oct. 19, 2010), 
http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2010/10/duty-dangers-traffic-stops.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/93GB-RBKE]; see also John Wills, Routine Traffic Stops, OFFICER.COM 
(June 3, 2013), https://www.officer.com/on-the-street/body-armor-protection/article/ 
10952972/routine-traffic-stops [https://perma.cc/GVG5-X7MN] (arguing that no traffic 
stop is “routine”). 
 467 Schwartz, supra note 243, at 547. 
 468 Id. at 548. 
 469 See Friedersdorf, supra note 460. 
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stops if they greatly increase the risk of police-involved shootings and pose risks 
to officer safety, without significantly enhancing road safety.470  
It is worth noting that quite a number of the most notorious police-involved 
shootings that have occurred over the past fifteen years involved traffic stops 
for relatively trivial violations that ultimately escalated out of control, resulting 
in the deaths of Samuel DuBose,471 Sandra Bland,472 Walter Scott,473 Philando 
Castile,474 Michael Bell,475 and others.476 Reducing the incidence of traffic stops 
is a systems-oriented strategy that could save the lives of approximately one 
hundred civilians477 and ten police officers per year.478  
 
 470 Unfortunately, police departments might resist any effort to reduce traffic stops 
because officers routinely use such stops—and accompanying searches incident to arrest, 
automobile searches, or inventory searches—to investigate non-traffic related crimes. See, 
e.g., Devallis Rutledge, Investigative Traffic Stops, POLICE MAG. (Sept. 1, 2005), 
https://www.policemag.com/339426/investigative-traffic-stops [https://perma.cc/N4 
JK-Q84P]. Recent Supreme Court cases have curtailed their power to do so, but not entirely 
eliminated it. See generally Barbara E. Armacost, Arizona v. Gant: Does It Matter?, 2009 
SUP. CT. REV. 275, 276 (arguing that Arizona v. Gant curtailed, but did not eliminate, traffic 
stops). In addition, police agencies would have to give up the notorious “Ferguson strategy” 
of using traffic stops to load citizens with tickets and fines in order to raise money for the 
city. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 9–15 (Mar. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf  [https:// 
perma.cc/Q84Z-AGZ6]; see also Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: 
Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 22 (2018) (discussing the 
revenue generated from economic sanctions and Ferguson County’s use of fines and fees as 
a major component of their municipal budget). That fewer traffic stops would curtail these 
two strategies would be an important win in my view. 
 471 Ryan Felton, Samuel DuBose Shooting Was Due to ‘Critical Errors in Judgment’, 
Report Finds, GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/ 
sep/11/sam-dubose-shooting-independent-report [https://perma.cc/XN6E-3B9Q]. 
 472 Laughland, supra note 7. 
 473 Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged with Murder 
of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-
carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html [https://perma.cc/8PZB-
99L8]. 
 474 Nelson, supra note 8. 
 475 Kennedy, supra note 210. 
 476 See supra notes 462–63 and accompanying text.  
 477 In the first six months of 2015, approximately 500 police officers were killed during 
policing activities, and nine percent of these deaths occurred during traffic stops, for a total 
of approximately 100 per year. See ZIMRING, supra note 249, at 51–53. For this data, Zimring 
relies on media reports linked to the Guardian’s descriptions of police killings reviewed and 
coded by researcher Colin Christensen. See id. app. at 259–85; see also The Counted, supra 
note 454 (discussing findings on the use of deadly force by police). 
 478 Between 2005 and 2014, 18.4% of the 505 felonious deaths of police officers resulted 
from traffic pursuits or stops, an average of nine per year. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Are Most 
Job-Related Deaths of Police Caused by Traffic Accidents?, WASH. POST (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/07/12/are-most-job-
related-deaths-of-police-caused-by-traffic-incidents/?utm_term=.766ad0a9c857 [on 
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A second important observation about the circumstances of deadly force is 
that the kind of threat that provoked deadly force was very different when the 
officer was alone.479 Single officers were more likely to use deadly force against 
the same threat than multiple officers.480 In addition, single officers who kill 
were at least nine times as likely to kill an assailant who had no weapon than 
officers in pairs or more.481 Zimring’s explanation is that “[a]s a matter of 
strategy as well as psychology, police officers who confront what they regard 
as danger are much more vulnerable when operating without the assistance and 
counsel of another officer.”482 This vulnerability might lead officers to take 
more precipitous and aggressive actions, as it causes stress that can increase the 
incidence of miscalculations, misjudgments, and errors.  
An obvious systems-oriented strategy is to make sure, as much as possible, 
that police officers act in pairs rather than alone. In addition, “a good tactical 
response to potential danger when it is operationally possible is to call for more 
police.”483 Zimring recommends a clear rule: “When police are in constant 
communication with dispatchers and their departments, a rule that prohibits 
shootings in favor of calling for assistance makes sense unless the absence of 
gunfire produces a true emergency where the officer or an innocent citizen will 
be in mortal danger.”484 This recommendation could call into question the broad 
scope and specific terms of active shooter policies.485 
A third observation that bears notice is that in approximately thirty-three 
percent of the police shootings—over 150 deaths per year—the person who was 
killed by gunfire had or was threatening to use only a knife, club, or other 
weapon that may have had little or no potential to kill the police officer.486 
Virtually all of the attacks that kill police officers—97.5%—are with 
firearms.487 FBI data shows that less than one percent of police deaths result 
 
file with Ohio State Law Journal]. Between 2014 and 2018, a total of twenty-four police 
officers were killed in traffic stops or pursuits, for an average of five per year. FED. BUREAU 
OF INVESTIGATION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2018 LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED & 
ASSAULTED 2 (2019), https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2018/tables/table-24.xls [https://perma 
.cc/N3B2-AJV8]. 
 479 ZIMRING, supra note 249, at 59–61. 
 480 Id. at 60–61. 
 481 Id. at 61. 
 482 Id. at 60. 
 483 Id. 
 484 Id. at 229. 
 485 See supra notes 356–61 and accompanying text.  
 486 See ZIMRING, supra note 249, at 57. This is an empirical claim, which Zimring 
supports with statistical evidence from websites and studies that track on-duty police officer 
fatalities from various causes. Id. For example, only two police officers were killed with 
knives or other cutting instruments in the United States between 2008–2013. Id. at 97. 
Significantly these deaths resulted at close range by assailants who had hidden knives. Id. 
 487 Id. at 96. 
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from knife wounds.488 In addition, British and German case studies show that 
protocols that use other than deadly force against knives and blunt instruments 
did not increase the risk to the lives of police in those countries.489 Zimring 
argues that the so-called “21-foot rule”—which advises deadly force against a 
knife-wielding attacker who comes within twenty-one feet—lacks empirical 
support.490 In light of existing data, Zimring proposes a blanket rule prohibiting 
deadly force in response to knives and blunt instruments with very few 
exceptions.491 
A fourth observation about the circumstances of deadly force is that about 
ten percent of all fatal shootings by police officers in the United States—or 
about 100 per year—take place where the potential assailant had no weapon at 
all.492 The question in these cases is whether police safety would be 
compromised by holding their fire in cases in which no weapon is observed. In 
its Guiding Principles On Use of Deadly Force, the Police Executive Research 
Forum concluded, based on international police studies, that non-shooting 
responses to no-weapon situations do not threaten police lives and safety: 
“Unless there is credible and specific intelligence that a suspect is armed with a 
deadly weapon, a ‘shoot first’ policy seems premature and should be 
prohibited.”493 
A fifth observation concerns the extent to which a deadly attack was 
ongoing and the total amount of deadly force used. A major factor contributing 
to civilian fatalities is the total number of gunshot wounds inflicted by police.494 
As neither official governmental reports nor the Guardian or Washington Post 
websites have kept comprehensive data on this issue, Zimring looked to a study 
of fatal and nonfatal shootings by the Chicago Police Department from 2007–
2013.495 He found that the death rate for multiple-wound shootings (fifty-one 
percent) was more than twice the death rate for single-wound shootings (twenty-
one percent), and that three-quarters of the civilian fatalities involved more than 
 
 488 Id. at 95, 229. In order to have complete information about the risk to police officers, 
however, we need additional data on the incidence and seriousness of nonfatal knife attacks, 
and the types of weapons and types of attacks that produce serious injuries. Id. at 163–64. 
 489 See id. at 80, 83–84, 90. 
 490 Id. at 100–01. The “21-foot rule” was apparently formulated by Lt. John Tueller, a 
firearms instructor with the Salt Lake City Police Department, who was said to have written 
that “it [is] entirely possible for a suspect armed with an edged weapon to fatally engage an 
officer armed with a handgun within a distance of 21 feet.” Id. at 100. The rule, which 
encourages officers to start shooting when knife-wielding adversaries are within twenty-one 
feet, has spread throughout the law enforcement community. Id. 
 491 Id. at 229.  
 492 ZIMRING, supra note 249, at 57. (This excludes situations where police saw 
something that turned out not to be a gun or weapon). Id. 
 493 Id. at 228 (citing Wexler, supra note 245, at 5–8). 
 494 Id. at 64. 
 495 Id. at 65. 
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one police-inflicted wound.496 The study demonstrates that police infliction of 
multiple wounds is a major risk in civilian deaths. According to Zimring, 
however, few if any departments have done research on the question of whether 
multiple shots are necessary to make police safer or made serious efforts to 
control multiple-shot continuations of shootings that were initially justified.497 
In light of the paucity of data to elucidate the possible effects of restrictions 
on continued shots, Zimring recommends restrictions in only three limited 
scenarios.498 But he calls the lack of reliable and detailed information on this 
and other issues concerning how weapons have been used in confrontation 
between civilians and police officers a “mind-boggling feature of the status quo 
in American police killings.”499 This absence of information “risks the lives not 
only of the victims of police shootings but also of police.”500 
In addition to Zimring, other police scholars have identified additional 
specific patterns in police shootings that call out for systems-oriented 
considerations. For example, Lawrence Sherman, who analyzed data from the 
Washington Post’s website, “Fatal Force,” in 2015, noticed that a majority of 
the shootings (fifty-one percent) in his seven-month sample occurred in 
communities of fewer than 50,000 people, and almost seventy percent occurred 
outside of major cities of 250,000 or more.501 In addition, the rate of police-
involved shootings per one-hundred homicides was six times greater in the 
smallest of communities, those with less than 10,000 people, as compared to the 
largest cities.502 Sherman argues that studies identifying different rates of 
shootings in different geographical and social contexts foregrounds 
“organizational and environmental differences in the potential causal 
mechanisms or their policy applications for reducing shootings.”503 
Joanna Schwartz has pointed to evidence suggesting that police overtime 
and “moonlighting” likely contribute to violence and error resulting from officer 
 
 496 See id. at 67–69. More than seventy-four percent of individuals who are wounded 
five or more times by police shootings die of their wounds. Id. at 69. 
 497 ZIMRING, supra note 249, at 231. 
 498 Zimring describes three settings where he believes available data justifies restrictions 
on continued shots: first, when an adversary may have a gun but has already been wounded 
by police fire; second, where the adversary has not fired shots and is now on the ground; and 
third, where the adversary is fleeing from a confrontation with police. In the first two 
scenarios, Zimring doubts there is a realistic danger that a non-shooting suspect will begin 
shooting if the officers stop their shots. In the third category, Zimring posits that the firing 
may be “motivated by apprehending the suspect or avoiding the frustration of defeat by 
escape” rather than reasonable risk of police being shot. Id. at 231–32. 
 499 Id. at 232. 
 500 Id. 
 501 Sherman, supra note 89, at 429 (citing Lawrence W. Sherman, Small is Dangerous: 
Community Size and Police Shooting Deaths, Presented at The American Society of 
Criminology 71st Annual Meeting (Nov. 18, 2015)). 
 502 Id. at 429–30. 
 503 Id. at 430. 
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fatigue.504 She cites studies demonstrating “that fatigued officers ‘were 
significantly more likely to associate African-Americans with weapons,’ 
received more complaints, were more likely to be involved in use of force 
incidents, and were more likely to commit ethics violations.”505 A systems-
oriented fix for this problem would be to limit the amount of time officers could 
work overtime, and limit their freedom to take on additional work. 
Schwartz has also identified contexts in which police agencies might adopt 
the use of “checklists,” a systems-oriented strategy that has been used with great 
success in commercial aviation and medicine.506 Checklists can be effective for 
educating or reminding actors of important steps that promote safety. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, carefully formulated checklists can improve safety even in 
recurring emergency or stressful circumstances by focusing the actor’s attention 
and laying out a logical sequence of considerations and actions where time is of 
the essence.507 In the policing context, checklists are being used in an attempt to 
reduce the disproportionately high incidence of shootings that occur during 
police interaction with individuals who have a history of mental illness.508 Two 
police agencies have begun field-testing a checklist (“screening form”) for 
identifying people with severe mental illness who may pose a danger to 
themselves or others.509 An important goal of the program is to collect data that 
can be analyzed and used to “establish a connection between a particular 
 
 504 Schwartz, supra note 243, at 550 (first citing KAREN L. AMENDOLA ET AL., POLICE 
FOUND., THE SHIFT LENGTH EXPERIMENT: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT 8-, 10-, AND 12-HOUR 
SHIFTS IN POLICING 35–36 (2011); and then citing Seth W. Stoughton, Moonlighting: The 
Private Employment of Off-Duty Officers, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1882–83 (2017); and 
then citing Bryan Vila, Sleep Deprivation: What Does It Mean For Public Safety Officers?, 
262 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 26, 26, 29 (2009)). 
 505 Id. (quoting Mike Maciag, The Alarming Consequences of Police Working Overtime, 
GOVERNING STATES & LOCALITIES (Oct. 2017), https://www.governing.com/topics/ 
public-justice-safety/gov-police-officers-overworked-cops.html [https://perma.cc/ 
BVT7-XWQH]) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 72 (Mar. 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/crt/legacy/2011/03/17/nopd_report.pdf  [https://perma.cc/B9SB-A8VR]). 
 506 Id. at 550–51. 
 507 See generally GAWANDE, supra note 31 (discussing the use and effectiveness of 
checklists in complicated, complex, and emergency situations in medical, aviation, and other 
high-risk scenarios). 
 508 Schwartz, supra note 243, at 550–51 (citing Gary Howell, The Dark Frontier: The 
Violent and Often Tragic Point of Contact Between Law Enforcement and the Mentally Ill, 
17 SCHOLAR 343, 367 (2015)). It has been estimated that approximately seven percent of 
police-civilian interactions in the United States involved persons with a mental illness. 
Christian Mason et al., Responding to Persons with Mental Illness: Can Screening Checklists 
Aid Law Enforcement?, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Feb. 4, 2014),
https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/responding-to-persons-with-mental-illness-
can-screening-checklists-aid-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/J8PD-H3W9]. 
 509 New Checklists Being Tested to Help Cops Respond to People with Mental Illness, 
POLICEONE.COM (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.policeone.com/emotionally-disturbed-
persons-edp/articles/4777754-New-checklist-being-tested-to-help-cops-respond-to-
people-with-mental-illness/ [https://perma.cc/ZNL4-DNBD]. 
982 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:5 
combination of observable characteristics and a high risk of potentially 
dangerous behavior.”510 The final step would be to incorporate these insights 
into police training to enhance the safety of police officers as well as mentally 
ill individuals. 
C. Challenges to Systems-Oriented Review: What Will It Take? 
In thinking about the application of sentinel event/systems-oriented review 
in the policing context it is useful to consider four circumstances that have been 
essential to the success of such review in aviation and medicine. 
First, in both contexts sentinel event review of certain kinds of incidents is 
mandatory, required by the NTSB in aviation and strongly encouraged by the 
Joint Commission in medicine.511 Second, in both contexts sentinel event review 
investigations enjoy some degree of protection from discovery in civil (and 
criminal) cases.512 Third, both contexts have organizations that can receive 
information from individual investigations, aggregate that information with 
investigative information from other similar events, and identify common 
causes.513 Fourth, both contexts have an official, institutional mechanism for 
conveying the results of sentinel event investigations of single events, or the 
safety recommendations they identify, back to their members, which promotes 
best practices across institutions.514 
 
 510 Id.; see also Mason et al., supra note 508 (recommending that law enforcement 
agencies adopt a checklist similar to the brief-jail-mental-health-screening (BJMHS) 
checklist that many local jails have adopted to screen arriving inmates along with Crisis 
Intervention Team (CIT) training).  
 511 See Report an Aircraft Accident to the NTSB, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, 
https://www.ntsb.gov/Pages/Report.aspx [https://perma.cc/3C3L-LK7W]; JOINT COMM’N, 
SENTINEL EVENTS (SE) 6 (Jan. 2016), https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/ 
1/6/CAMH_24_SE_all_CURRENT.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZFK9-HT6E]. 
 512 See JOINT COMM’N, supra note 511, at 13; Confidentiality and Incentives to Report, 
AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYS., https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/confidentiality.html 
[https://perma.cc/X5KG-MSBZ]. See generally ALEXANDER T. WELLS & CLARENCE C. 
RODRIGUES, COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY 87–88 (4th ed. 2003) (describing the Aviation 
Safety Reporting System, a voluntary, confidential reporting system designed to gather the 
maximum amount of information without discouraging the reporter). 
 513 See JOINT COMM’N, supra note 511, at 12; WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 512, at 
52–68 (describing the role of the National Transportation and Safety Board in investigating 
airline accidents, creating accident reports, making safety recommendations, and publicizing 
reports and safety information); Program Briefing, AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYS., 
https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/summary.html [https://perma.cc/FKT7-GMBQ] 
(describing role of ASRS in “collect[ing], analyz[ing] and respond[ing] to voluntarily 
submitted aviation safety incident reports in order to lessen the likelihood of aviation 
accidents”). 
 514 See JOINT COMM’N, supra note 511, at 14; WELLS & RODRIGUES, supra note 512, at 
87 (explaining that the Aviation Safety Reporting System analyzes data and publicizes 
reports of its findings); Program Outputs, AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING SYS., 
https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/outputs.html [https://perma.cc/2NT6-M75V] (ASRS 
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These features pose notable—but not insurmountable—challenges for the 
potential success of systems-oriented review and prevention in policing. Unlike 
aviation and medicine, policing is highly decentralized. Police agencies lack an 
authoritative, institutional mechanism for mandating investigations and for 
prescribing the kind of review designed to uncover systems-oriented solutions. 
Instead, police departments have their own localized mechanisms such as 
internal affairs review and civilian oversight board review for reviewing 
incidents that occur in their own jurisdiction.515 Unlike airlines and hospitals, 
police departments are not required to collect the kind of data necessary for 
identifying patterns and systems vulnerabilities.516 Without such data, police 
agencies cannot make evidence-based decisions designed to reduce the risks of 
harm-causing conduct by police.517 
In addition, policing has no widely accepted, centralized mechanism for 
collecting, receiving, and analyzing crucial information derived from sentinel 
event/systems-oriented reviews.518 This lack of centralization severely limits the 
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ability to identify repeated errors and patterns across harm-causing incidents 
like police shootings. It also limits the potential for disseminating crucial 
information from lessons learned. Evidence from other fields has shown that in 
order for learning to result from sentinel event review, there must be an 
intentional plan to disseminate the findings of the investigation and to ensure 
that the recommendations are “salient and actionable.”519  
Centralization of sentinel event review in aviation also means that reviews 
are done by an on-call, multidisciplinary team that includes not only subject 
matter experts (pilots, flight attendants, mechanics) but also experts in risk 
management.520 Just as NTSB investigation enables a kind of review that would 
be impossible for individual airlines, police agencies would benefit from the 
availability of centralized, multidisciplinary resources for expert investigation 
and data gathering. Importantly, these external reviews would be designed not 
to blame individual officers, but to identify system vulnerabilities and systems-
oriented solutions. 
Sentinel event review by a team that includes risk management experts also 
ensures that recommendations will be systems-oriented and effective. 
Recommendations by local teams without such expertise are often what systems 
analysts would call “weak,” meaning solutions such as reminders, additional 
training, or policy rewrites.521 These kinds of fixes may simply result in risk 
migration, where the mitigation of one risk simply results in a new risk.522 In 
addition, they do not address latent causes, such as poorly designed technology 
or defective operational systems, systems problems that predispose to human 
error.523 Involving human factor experts increases the likelihood of stronger, 
more effective solutions. 
The challenges to sentinel event review in policing are real but by no means 
unsurmountable, and the rewards of such review are enormous. First and 
foremost, systems review holds the potential to reduce the number of police 
shootings and begin to chip away at the layers of police-citizen animosity 
repeatedly stoked by civilian deaths at the hands of police. This would be 
infinitely good, not only for civilians but for police officers, many of whom 
labor faithfully in difficult circumstances and bear the brunt of public anger and 
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suspicion. In addition, focusing on prevention has great potential to increase 
police officer safety. According to Professor Zimring, there have been no 
rigorous, scientific, systems-oriented evaluations of the strategies and tactics 
that are designed to protect police.524 These benefits make systems-oriented 
review worth fighting for.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite its significant promise, systems-oriented review will likely face 
resistance. Some of the strongest resistance may come from police departments 
themselves and from the communities that are most affected by police 
shootings. 
Police departments are notoriously defensive toward outside investigations 
of police shootings and other incidents.525 Systems solutions may be suspect, 
especially if they are viewed as being imposed by authorities outside of the 
police department without taking account of the realities on the ground.526 
Police leaders might be slow to let go of deeply held, but unsupported 
assumptions about risks to their safety, for example the belief that ordinary 
traffic stops pose a very high risk of officers being shot.527 They are also likely 
to resist bright-line rules against vigorously defended practices—such as the use 
of lethal force against suspects in fleeing vehicles or suspects within twenty-one 
feet brandishing a knife—which increase the risk of unnecessary shootings, i.e., 
shootings not required to protect police or public safety.528 Police may also resist 
other systems-oriented reforms that threaten police practices offering collateral 
benefits aside from safety. For example, a move to reduce traffic stops would 
undermine policing’s widespread practice of using such pretextual stops to 
investigate unrelated crimes.529 Getting police departments on board for 
systemic changes will pose significant challenges. 
In a surprising way, though, systems review actually holds promise for 
responding to some of law enforcement’s own most vehement criticisms of civil 
actions and criminal prosecutions against police officers. The law enforcement 
community complains that legal actions make the officer who pulled the trigger 
a “scapegoat” for merely doing his job. In addition, they assert that such actions 
are never about one shooting; rather, legal actions blame one officer for what 
communities deem a long history of police transgressions. It turns out that 
systems review may actually address these criticisms in important ways.  
The goal of systems review is precisely to get beyond the single-minded 
focus on blaming the shooter in order to identify workplace and organizational 
causes that lie behind the last human causer. By focusing on systemic causes, 
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systems-oriented review has the effect of spreading the blame so that individual 
officers are not the only ones held responsible for harm-causing incidents and 
are not left to bear alone the professional and personal consequences of having 
taken a human life. By reducing the likelihood that sharp end actors will make 
mistakes—including reasonable mistakes—systems solutions should ultimately 
reduce the likelihood that officers will be blamed for just “doing their job.” 
Moreover, data-driven improvements in police use of firearms will ultimately 
increase officer safety. In short, if articulated clearly and done right, systems 
review should prove appealing to the policing community.  
Another source of resistance to systems review will likely come from the 
communities that have experienced the most harm from police shootings. Public 
resistance takes us back to where we started: when there is a police shooting, 
families and communities understandably look for someone—a human being—
to blame. The need to hold someone accountable is deeply embedded in human 
nature. For this purpose, systems review seems inadequate. After all, it looks for 
causes that lie behind the immediate human causer to identify underlying 
systems vulnerabilities that contributed to the harm-causing action. Solutions 
are forward-looking and preventative, rather than backward-looking and 
blaming. While systems analysis need not (and should not) replace some form 
of accountability review, loosening the grip on blaming is likely to go down 
hard in communities plagued by police-involved shootings. 
The best response to the anticipated public reaction against systems-
oriented review is this: the vast majority of police-involved shootings are 
ultimately deemed “justified” or “reasonable” by police investigators and 
courts, and that is the end of the investigation. Most police-involved shootings 
do not result in criminal charges and even fewer in convictions. This is true even 
in the many cases in which the shooting was factually unnecessary under the 
circumstances (i.e., the suspect was unarmed or the officer’s safety was not 
actually at risk). As much as we might want to think otherwise, under our current 
system there is almost no “accountability” of the sort communities are crying 
out for. By adopting systems-oriented review, virtually nothing will be lost, and 
much will be gained.  
I am not arguing that police officers should escape responsibility when they 
do misbehave. But our current relentless focus on accountability—while an 
understandable human reaction—has become the enemy of prevention in the 
very communities that need it most. 
